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Abstract
The following discussion paper explores the heated debate around ‘common goals and 
differential commitments’ in international development cooperation. It tries to capture the 
views and positions of the so-called ‘emerging economies’ on their role and contribution 
to global development and the post-2015 agenda. It explains the divergence between 
North-South and South-South cooperation with regard to their historical narratives, con-
ceptual paradigms, delivery approaches, functions and capacity. It highlights the impor-
tance of standard-setting, monitoring, accountability and peer-review but it also explains 
the technical challenges and political tensions in bringing the ‘Southern providers’ into the 
regimes and systems led by the OECD-DAC and the current post-Busan Global Partner-
ship. The paper explains the challenges of categorising the new development partners, and 
defining and measuring the quantum, quality and effectiveness of their development coop-
eration activities. It stresses the importance of developing a framework for monitoring and 
evaluating South-South cooperation and the identification of appropriate institutional 
platforms for such discussions to take place. The paper is based on empirical research and 
engagement with numerous Southern stakeholders and offers concrete policy proposals for 
the different development partners involved in the debate. 
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Summary
 “…we now all form an integral part of a new and more inclusive development agenda, in 
which actors participate on the basis of common goals, shared principles and differential 
commitments” (Busan HLF-4 Outcome Document 2011)
This was one of the iconic sentences captured in the outcome document emerging from the 
deeply debated Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) in December 
2011. ‘Differential commitments’, an idea similar to ‘common but differentiated responsi-
bility’ (CBDR) emerging from the climate change talks, is a sensitive and highly politi-
cised concept which has frequently been used in recent global policy negotiations. It now 
also captures the spirit in which middle-income countries view their role in the interna-
tional development arena.  
The following paper discusses the heated topic around the role of emerging economies in 
global development. It unpacks the fuzzy concept of ‘differential commitments’ and the 
sensitivities around ‘accountability’ in international development cooperation. It explains 
how traditional donors have been encouraging a more universal approach to ‘shared re-
sponsibilities’, while emerging partners continue to highlight their specificities and the 
ongoing development challenges they still face within their territories. As the post-2015 
global development agenda is currently being defined, most divergence will be on how the 
new development campaign will be implemented and financed, and the specific role ex-
pected from each player.  
The paper is prefaced by a discussion on the controversy and complexities around even 
categorising such new groups of ‘emerging development partners’. The author argues that 
there is no clear economic logic or development rationale in defining the new group of 
‘Southern providers’ and that, rather, this new sub-division emerges out of a political 
drive. The consequences of such a re-categorisation process for middle-income countries 
(still greatly challenged by poverty and inequality) has been a reduction of aid received, 
and intensified pressure to share with industrialised countries the burden of responsibilities
for international development. Though acknowledging the important role and contribution 
of South-South cooperation to global development, this paper explains that this cannot be 
put on the same level plane as North-South cooperation (NSC), which is essentially differ-
ent in its historical narrative, its conceptual paradigm, function, delivery approach and 
financial capacity. This is the reason for the call by Southern providers for ‘differential 
commitments’ in international development. 
The current discussion around South-South cooperation versus North-South cooperation is 
heavily tainted by polarised opinions and political rhetoric, but overall very little empirical 
evidence exists on the quality, effectiveness and impact of South-South cooperation on 
Africa and the rest of the developing world. This stems from major information gaps, and 
the monitoring and evaluation challenges faced by almost all emerging donors. To conduct 
such analytical exercises there is a need to agree on common definitions, standards, norms, 
criteria, measurement and reporting systems, which are currently not available for South-
ern providers. The paper stresses the importance of standard-setting, accountability and 
peer review and goes on to illustrate some of the current systems in place to monitor and 
evaluate international development cooperation, such as the UN, the OECD, and some 
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2 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
Southern pilots. It discusses the strength and weaknesses of these various different interna-
tional regimes of ‘soft law’ and explains the need for combining inclusiveness, technical 
soundness, and political engagement in order to ensure an effective monitoring system.  
The paper illustrates the OECD-DAC as the oldest and most seasoned institution to moni-
tor quantity and quality of development assistance, but also elaborates on the apprehension 
of Southern partners to join this system for historical and ideological reasons. It discusses 
the evolution of the various High Level Forums (Rome, Paris, Accra, Busan) into gradu-
ally more inclusive platforms and explains the efforts of the DAC to reach out to emerging 
economies and bring them into the aid effectiveness process. It provides rich insights on 
the complexities of negotiating the Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Co-operation (GPEDC), as a new universal forum where norms and monitoring frame-
works can be developed for different players and different financing mechanisms for de-
velopment. The obsessive drive to bring emerging economies in the Busan process finally 
resulted in a compromised outcome document and the eventual distancing of some BRICS 
countries from a process which they still view as very ‘DAC-driven’ and based on an 
antiquated ‘Northern’ paradigm which they do not agree with and whose rules they do not 
want to follow or be assessed against.
Reflecting G77 sentiments, some middle-income countries are still suspicious of the DAC 
and view it still as ‘an agent of Northern hegemony’, while others are more pragmatic and 
see the Global Partnership as a space to influence development policy and learn useful 
lessons from traditional donors. While there are some areas of convergence between 
North-South and South-South cooperation, for political reasons and technical constraints, 
most emerging economies believe that the norms and systems to monitor development 
cooperation of the traditional donors are not appropriate to also evaluate cooperation ac-
tivities of Southern providers. While keeping a ‘differential’ approach in global account-
ability, the paper discusses some basic principles such as transparency, untying of aid, and 
country-led ownership, which need to be applied for the benefit of the poorest partner 
countries during development cooperation.  
The paper concludes by emphasising the importance for middle-income countries of de-
vising their own alternative framework to the DAC, where they can define, monitor and 
evaluate their development cooperation. Such a Southern framework would encourage 
learning, improve effectiveness, promote accountability and advance the South-South 
narrative. This also implies finding appropriate platforms (inclusive, well-resourced, po-
litically effective) for Southern partners to engage in such discussion. The paper explores 
various options for the development of the South-South development cooperation dis-
course, including the use of regional platforms, the GPEDC, the United Nations Develop-
ment Cooperation Forum (UNDCF), the G20 development working group, the BRICS and 
the IBSA alliance, elaborating for each of them their pros and their cons.  
The exposé captures some of the latest discussions held in New Delhi (2013) and in other 
meetings of the South, where many of these issues have been debated. It is the result of in-
depth analysis on the topic, empirical research, and inputs received from a variety of 
stakeholders involved in the process. It provides policy proposals for the various partners 
and hopes to be a contribution to the upcoming debates leading up to the first ministerial 
meeting of the Global Partnership to be held in Mexico in the early part of 2014.
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Policy recommendations
Distilled from the discussions that have emerged in the research process, the author offers 
some key recommendations to the various stakeholders involved in this debate on how the 
agenda discussed above can be propelled forward: 
x Traditional/DAC donors need to ease the current pressure on emerging economies 
to share the burden of responsibilities on global development commitments. They 
should demonstrate example and moral leadership by fulfilling their own out-
standing commitments with regards to both quantity and quality of their assistance 
to the developing world. This should also include continued provision of aid to 
middle-income countries, still faced with vast poverty challenges. Furthermore in-
dustrialised countries need to take a more holistic approach to policy coherence for 
development, insuring also that their domestic policies benefit (or at least do not 
harm) developing countries. x South-South cooperation providers need to improve the transparency of their de-
velopment cooperation data and strengthen their M&E systems, to provide better 
evidence on SSC flows. They should take leadership in developing a common ana-
lytical framework that allows for the definition and measurement of the effective-
ness, quality and impact of their SSC programmes. One or more platforms (includ-
ing the IBSA) could be exploited to conduct such technical discussions, promote 
exchange and peer learning, and consolidate global information on SSC. Southern 
providers must be ready to invest political and financial capital in such initiatives.  x Recipient partner countries must urgently develop and strengthen their national 
monitoring frameworks, making sure all development partners (North, South, state 
and non-state actors) are kept accountable in their development cooperation and 
that different types of aid activities are aligned to the host country’s priorities, 
norms, and existing systems. Beneficiary countries must basically be in the driving 
seat and set the rules of the game for all development players! x Multilateral platforms (OECD/UN) should consider shifting the operational centre 
of any ‘global partnership for development’ away from Paris (and even New York) 
to preferably a developing country (ideally in Africa) which should provide strong 
political backing as well as host the secretariat of such a global partnership. Finan-
cial and technical resources should be provided by all partners engaged in the plat-
form in proportion to their economic means. International development coopera-
tion regimes need to go beyond the monitoring of aid to make partners accountable 
for broader issues around policy coherence for development (PCD). x Academia and think-tanks (preferably from the South) need to conduct more in-
depth analysis, field research and rigorous impact evaluations of SSC in benefici-
ary countries (particularly in Africa). This will help move away from political 
rhetoric to empirical evidence with regards to the role of SSC vis-à-vis NSC and its 
contribution to development outcomes for the poorest and most marginalised popu-
lations.
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1. Introduction: who exactly are these ‘new kids on the block’? 
The development landscape has transformed itself drastically from what it used to be 
thirty years ago, or even fifteen years ago when the Millennium Development Goals were 
initially conceptualised. Paradigms, approaches, modalities and players are more hetero-
geneous than ever before, thus the global community is now reassessing the roles, respon-
sibilities and accountability of the various stakeholders involved in international develop-
ment processes. In the current political and academic debates there is often reference to 
‘emerging economies’, ‘southern powers’, ‘threshold countries’, ‘provider-recipient coun-
tries’, ‘South-South cooperation (SSC) providers’ and ‘new donors’ which can often lead 
to some confusion. The following paper discusses the role of these new players in the 
international development architecture.
Before embarking on a discussion around ‘differential responsibilities’ in global develop-
ment, one must first of all be clear which group of countries we are exactly talking about. 
What distinguishes the so-called ‘Southern providers’ from other developing countries? Is 
it politics or economics that define this new category of countries? Are North-South con-
ceptual divides still relevant? Where do we draw the line between ‘developing’, ‘devel-
oped’ and ‘in-between countries’? How do we define and measure a nation’s ‘develop-
ment’ and by what value system? When does a nation stop needing assistance and when 
should it start helping others? These are critical questions that are the bases of any further 
debate around rights, roles, responsibilities and expectations within the international de-
velopment system. This opening section will discuss the complexities and controversies of 
trying to define such new constituents of development partners. 
Old school 
International development cooperation originated in a political and economic landscape 
post-World War II in which the world was defined by the Western capitalist block, the 
Eastern communist block and the Third World group of (mostly poor) nations contested 
between the two major ideological camps. There were wealthy industrialised, ‘developed’ 
nations mostly in the geographic North, and poor countries in the South that were still 
dependent on aid from their former colonizers and the major powers to support their 
economies, infrastructure and nation-building process. Political alliances and organisa-
tions were established in the second half of the twentieth century that assisted different 
groups of nations to negotiate better their positions within multilateral forums such as the 
United Nations (UN), Word Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Among these political constructs, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), particularly its Development Assistance Com-
mittee (DAC), become synonymous with the high-income countries and ‘Western donors’, 
while the Group of 77 (G77) become associated with the ‘aid-receiving countries’ mostly 
in the Southern hemisphere. The G77 has become the common voice of poor countries, a 
‘coalition of the dissatisfied’ (Nganje 2013), which rarely missed an opportunity at inter-
national meetings to blame the ‘developed’ countries for their problems and to remind 
them of their obligations to provide compensatory assistance (Atwood 2012). Since then, 
the global economic landscape has changed drastically, calling these old country group-
ings into question; however these historical legacies still play a major role in the politics 
of international development cooperation even today. 
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The usual suspects 
The world has come a long way and the development landscape is not as black and white 
anymore. In recent decades some countries have switched from being aid recipients to aid 
providers, and some are still in between. This is a new grouping that is not yet well de-
fined, does not have a narrative, a clear constituency and thus a common position on world 
affairs. Kragelund (2010) has commented on the rise of non-traditional/non-DAC donors 
like Brazil, South Africa, India and China as some of the BASIC countries who have for 
decades participated in development cooperation, particularly in Africa. Grimm et al. 
(2009) attempt to categorise this grouping of emerging donors by assessing their activities 
in terms of financial volumes, their priorities and aid practices, their relation to multilat-
eral institutions, and the implications of their engagement for the future of European aid. 
In the last decade these countries have been associated by recent loose alliances, such as 
the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) association or the emerging coun-
tries who are members of the Group of 20 (G20) of major global economies such as Ar-
gentina, Brazil, India, South Africa, Korea, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. 
Some include in the category of Southern providers most of the Gulf countries which have 
very quickly switched from being developing to being very rich nations because of oil 
exports. Some economist such as Ward, Geoghegen, O’Neill1 have forecasted the upcom-
ing rise of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey (MIKT) and Colombia, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey (CIVETS) as the ‘third wave’ of SSC providers (Schulz, 2010). 
Different industrialised countries2 have identified some of these emerging powers as key 
strategic players to engage in addressing national, regional and global concerns (see more 
in next section). 
Giving and receiving 
South-South cooperation – sharing knowledge, experiences, resources and technical ex-
pertise among developing nations – has existed for decades, even between the poorest 
countries. What has caught global attention in the recent decade is that once poverty-
stricken countries like China, India, Brazil, Venezuela, South Korea and Turkey, are con-
tributing each year between US $500 million and US $4 billion in development assistance 
(UN-ECOSOC, 2008, 2009, UNDESA, 2010)3, surpassing in some cases the aid provided 
by some of the smaller DAC countries. Paradoxically, many of these middle-income coun-
tries are still large recipients of aid from external partners. Colombia for example, while 
being an active South-South provider, is also the biggest ODA recipient in Latin America. 
Countries such as Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
are major donors and have among the highest per-capita income in the world, yet they are 
still part of the G77 representing the developing nations. This dual role is however not 
limited only to the South. During its devastating earthquake in 2011, Japan received hu-
manitarian support even from very poor countries such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Swazi-

1 See for instance http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c14730ae-aff3-11e1-ad0b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2e03o-
VWew, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/citydiary/7886195/Geoghegan-digests-and-delivers-
new-acronym.html, http://www.economist.com/blogs/theworldin2010/2009/11/acronyms_4, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/27/hsbc-emergingmarkets-idUSLDE63Q26Q20100427. 
2  See, for example, BMZ (2011), German Strategy for Development Cooperation with Global Develop-
ment Partners 2011-2015, BMZ Strategy Paper 6, Bonn (2011). 
3  See also http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/pdfs/south-south_cooperation.pdf. 
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land and Haiti4. In recent years, Mexico provided technical assistance to New York City; 
Angola offered to bail out Portugal’s debt crisis; Papua New Guinea and Indonesia helped 
Australia during its floods. Does this imply a reversal of roles between donors and recipi-
ents? Though low-income countries, Ecuador, Nigeria and Honduras also provide assis-
tance to other countries, so should they also be categorised as Southern providers? Where 
do we draw the line? Such clear-cut categorisations between providers and receivers are 
not possible anymore today. The richest country in the world, the United States, has mil-
lions of people living in poverty that require ‘aid’, while even the poorest nations have 
people wealthy in resources and in knowledge that can contribute to the welfare of the 
global community. 
Limits of the definition of Official Development Assistance 
The current definition of ‘aid’ was set in 1972 by the DAC and until today governs the 
great part of development cooperation globally. It was deliberately restricted, as previ-
ously donors would include in their reporting of aid to the developing world expenses 
such as military operations, war reparations costs and support to former colonies5, debt 
reorganisation, exports promotion, and refugee and student support costs incurrent in do-
nor countries. The current definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA) (see 
OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms) implies that the money, goods and technical assis-
tance is provided to other countries with a ‘developmental purpose’ (not commercial or 
political), through ‘official’ government channels, and on ‘concessional’ terms (with a 
grant element of 25%).  
This automatically to a great extent restricts much of the assistance provided by the South, 
which often takes the form of peace-keeping efforts, refugee and student support, debt 
reorganisation, trade facilitation, private investment, less concessional loans and credit 
lines - but still very beneficial to recipient countries. For this and other reasons (explained 
later in the paper), South-South development cooperation flows are very difficult to meas-
ure as they are not recorded in a coherent way by the different countries. A large portion 
of development assistance from the South is technical cooperation, transfer of technology, 
skills, know-how, training and scholarships that are difficult (although not impossible) to 
quantify and assign monitory value to, especially when making cross-country compari-
sons. Is training offered by the Americans better than Indian capacity-building pro-
grammes? Are Norwegian engineers and doctors more valuable than South African or 
Colombian specialists? The costs assigned to the technical inputs can vary extensively 
between countries, and the quality and outcome of such services are also subjective. 
Support is not only in financial terms, but can often be more valuable in the form of peo-
ple, time, knowledge and technology. A lot of countries contribute more generously 
through ‘unofficial’ channels – through private philanthropy, religious charities, civil 
society and volunteer organisations rather than government channels. Hence, this is not 
recorded as ODA. The Hudson Institute (2012), for example, estimates that American 
philanthropy to developing countries reached US $38 billion against the official budget of 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) of US $29 billion. With 

4  Discussion with Japanese academics in Johannesburg, August 2013. 
5  As in the case of France and Japan. 
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that same token, Charities Aid Foundation (2012) has ranked Liberia number 11 in the 
World Giving Index, above most of the DAC countries.6
Growth, power, influence 
As we have established that being considered a provider or a receiver of development 
assistance can be a fairly relative exercise, why are some countries elevated to the ranks of 
‘emerging powers’? Many developing countries have certainly caused a shift in the eco-
nomic and political power balances of the world. In certain industries, some middle-
income countries are global leaders and have become serious trading competitors to the 
OECD countries. Countries such as Brazil, South Africa and India also exert a significant 
political, cultural and economic influence in their surrounding areas and can thus be con-
sidered ‘regional powers’. Some have also extended their influence beyond their region 
and now additionally have a significant presence on the African continent (see Chaturvedi 
et al. 2012; Alden / Vieira 2011).
In the case of China, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Brazil, population size plays a huge 
role in affecting global trends in energy and environmental footprints, food security, life-
style consumption, trade and all other aspects of global development. Geographic spread 
also allows these countries to have access to a wide range of natural resources and main-
tain a diversified base of agricultural and industrial production. Services and manufactur-
ing from these countries are also very competitive due to low costs and high labour pro-
ductivity. Most of these countries witnessed spectacular growth over the past decades, and 
hold large reserves of foreign currency (BMZ 2011). However many of these fast-growing 
economies are highly driven by oil exports such as Venezuela, the Gulf countries and even 
Nigeria. These economies are thus still fragile and subject to shocks based on shifts in fuel 
prices that could potentially cause economic gains to be easily reversed (Roubini 2013; 
Sharma 2013). 
Aside from economic strength, many of these countries hold significant military arsenals 
and nuclear capabilities and exert significant political influence in multilateral institutions. 
Notwithstanding their social and economic status they are often considered ‘great powers’ 
globally or in their regions, capable of exerting their influence in multilateral discussions 
and shaping international affairs (Kennedy 2010; Cooper / Antkiewicz / Shaw 2007; Coo-
per / Mo 2013; Buzan / Wæver 2003). 
Many of the recent Southern political alliances such as BRICS and IBSA (India, Brazil, 
South Africa) are informal clubs aimed at promoting collaboration among the powers of 
the South, joining forces to restructure the global economic and political governance and 
realigning power balances. South Africa is far from being comparable to the other BRICS 
with regards to population and size of the economy, however its strategic geo-political 
location allows it to be the gateway to the rest of the continent. Its legitimacy to be part of 
bodies such as G20 and BRICS stems from the important role it plays in Africa, therefore 
it feels morally obliged to advocate for the priorities of the continent in every global fo-
rum. Nevertheless, South Africa is closely tailed by other fast-growing economies rising 
on the continent, such as Nigeria and Angola, though still at early stages of their develop-
ment. 

6  See http://www.cafonline.org/PDF/WorldGivingIndex2012WEB.pdf. 
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Poverty and inequality 
Many of the middle-income countries who sit around the table of the G20 do so because 
of their overall gross domestic product (GDP). Yet it would be a mistake to base their 
development status only on such a parameter. Using GDP per capita gives a slightly better 
indication on the well-being of the general population. Most of such middle-income coun-
tries in fact have extremely high inequality levels and uneven wealth distributions (see 
GINI coefficient). This can often be the cause of social unrest and protest as has been the 
case even recently in South Africa, Mexico, Turkey and Brazil7. While at times resem-
bling highly industrialised countries of Europe and North America, many of these emerg-
ing economies have regions of their countries that resemble some of the poorest countries 
in Africa. If we take a people-centred rather than a country-centred approach to develop-
ment (Glennie 2011a; Sumner 2012a/b), most poor people of the world live in middle-
income countries. India alone has almost the same amount of people living below US $2 a 
day than the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa. It thus becomes problematic for such govern-
ments to justify with their domestic constituency the need to provide aid overseas when 
there are so many problems back home to be addressed. 
Finally, definitions of ‘development’ and ‘poverty’ need to go beyond antiquated material 
conceptions of income, technology and infrastructure. South Asian economists, such as 
Amartya Sen (1999) and Mabub-ul Haq (1995), have proposed more holistic notions of 
‘human development’ which have been accompanied by new matrixes such as the Human 
Development Index (HDI) and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). These are 
potentially better indicators than GDP to measure countries’ development progress, and 
thus requirements of external assistance. 
A confusing picture
As discussed above, defining a new category of so-called ‘emerging economies’ can be 
extremely problematic and controversial. Often these lines do not follow an economic 
logic or clear development reasoning. While attempts have been made by scholars (Krage-
lund 2010; Grimm et al. 2009; Chaturvedi / Fues / Sidiropoulos 2012), by economists at 
Goldman Sachs and at the HSBC Group, and by the OECD to group such middle-income 
countries, these country typologies are neither particularly clear nor scientifically consis-
tent. Rather, such a subdivision of the development landscape into traditional (DAC) do-
nors, low-income recipient countries, and ‘emerging donors’ merely boils down to more 
political manoeuvring (an aspect that will be discussed in the next section). 
Depending on the political lens they use, different analysts and policy-makers make their 
own conclusions as to which countries to include in the category of emerging partners in 
debates around international development. Below is a list of some countries commonly 
referred to in academic and policy circles as Southern providers. The countries are com-
pared along a number of economic, political and developmental parameters. While most 
of these countries are members of the G77 and consider themselves developing nations, 
the reader will observe that, on many of the indicators, they come close or even surpass  

7  Mine workers upheaval in South Africa in 2012; teachers strike in Mexico August 2013; public protests 
in Brazil around the World Cup expenditures 2013; clashes between protesters and police in Turkey in 
2013. 
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some of the traditional DAC donors. While Russia is sometimes lumped with these coun-
tries because of BRICS, the author has decided not to include it in the list for obvious 
historical and political reasons. Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) is another major Southern donor 
that provides between US$ 360-530 million a year in ODA (0.13% of GDP) to other de-
veloping counties8; however due to its complicated political status, it is difficult to gather 
the appropriate social-economic data from the multilateral organisations about the island. 
Amounts of aid received originate from OECD databases, and figures of aid provided 
come from UN publications, or other academic sources9. However, as discussed earlier 
and later in the paper, such numbers need to be treated with extreme caution. 
Table 1: Major middle-income countries compared on various development parameters
GDP
nominal10
GDP per 
capita11
(World
Bank
classifi-
cation)12
People
living in 
dire
poverty13
GINI
coeffi-
cient 
inequality
HDI14 Aid
pro-
vided15
(percent-
age of 
GNI)
ODA
re-
ceived
16
G7717 OECD
/ DAC 
G20
Argentina 446.044 10,942 
Upper
MIC
1.9% 
0.7 million 
44.5 0.811 
Very 
high
14 84 Y N/N Y 
Brazil 2,476.652 12,594 
Upper
MIC
10,8% 
20.8
million 
54.7 0.730 
High
300-
1,000 
870 Y N/N Y 
Chile 248.585 14,394 
Upper
MIC
2.7% 
0.4 million 
52.1 0.819 
Very 
high
7 161 Y Y/N  
China 7,318.499 5,445 
Upper
MIC
27.2% 
363.8
million 
42 0.699 
Medium
3,000-
8,000 
-79618 Y N/N Y 
Colombia 333.372 7,104 
Upper
MIC
15.8% 
7.3 million 
55.9 0.719 
High
0.4 1,024 Y N/N  
Egypt 229.531 2,781 
Lower
MIC
15.4% 
13.1
million 
30.8 0.662 
Medium
18.4 412 Y N/N  

8  See, for instance, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/FileList/DownLoadPage/?opno=67c9cebc-c85e-
4713-9b1f-be189ae1d4bf,http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=179966&ctNode=445,http://focus 
taiwan.tw/news/aipl/201308180026.aspx,http://idct.cier.edu.tw/eng/a01.htm,http://taiwantoday.tw/ct. 
asp?xItem=182177&ctNode=425.
9  Some of these figures are drawn from presentations made by various different experts at the workshop 
on ‘Development Agencies of Emerging Powers’ held in Mexico City in August 2013. 
10  Billions of US dollars a year (Source: World Bank statistics, 2011). 
11  Figures in US dollars (Source: World Bank statistics, 2011). 
12  MIC = middle-income country and HIC = high-income country. 
13  Percentage of population and number of people living on less than US $2 a day (purchasing power 
parity (PPP)) (source World Bank statistics, 2010). 
14  Source: UNDP 2013, Human Development Report. 
15  Millions of US dollars (Source: OECD, 2013c; UNDESA estimates; Southern think-tanks & 
academics). 
16  Million US dollars ODA disbursed in 2011 (Source: OECD, 2013c). 
17  Y = yes: member of the country grouping, N = no: not member of country grouping 
18  Negative because of loan repayments. 
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India 1,872.840 1,509 
Lower
MIC
68.8% 
842.5 
million 
33.0 0.554 
Medium
700-
3,000 
3,221 Y N/N Y 
Indonesia 846.832 3,495 
Lower
MIC
46.1% 
110.5
million 
35.6 0.629 
Medium
580 415 Y N/N Y 
S. Korea 1,116.247 22,424 
HIC
 31.3 0.909 
Very 
high
1,550 
(0.13%) 
118 N Y/Y Y 
Kuwait 176.590 62,664 
HIC
  0.790 
High
144-283 N Y N/N  
DAC 
Compara-
tor
Iceland 
14.026 
Czech 
Rep.
20,677 
HIC
USA19
1.2% 
3.8 million 
USA 
45.0 
Portugal
0.816 
Very 
high
Greece 
324
0.13% 
South
Korea
118
N Y/Y
Malaysia 287.937 9,977 
Upper
MIC
2.3% 
0.6 million 
46.2 0.769 
High
17 31 Y N/N  
Mexico 1,153.343 10,047 
Upper
MIC
4.5% 
5.1 million 
47.2 0.775 
High
320 963 N Y/N Y 
Saudi
Arabia
576.824 20,540 
HIC
  0.782 
High
5,075 
(0.85%) 
N Y N/N Y 
Singapore 239.700 46,241 
HIC
 48.1 0.895 
Very 
high
62 N Y N/N  
South
Africa
408.237 8,070 
Upper
MIC
31.3% 
15.6
million 
63.1 0.629 
Medium
95-3,000 
(0.2%-
1%)20
1,398 Y N/N Y 
Thailand 345.672 4,972 
Upper
MIC
4.1% 
2.8 million 
39.4 0.690 
Medium
30-180 (500) Y N/N  
Turkey 774.983 10,524 
Upper
MIC
4.7% 
3.4 million 
40.0 0.722 
High
2,531 
0.32% 
3,193 N Y/N Y 
UAE 360.245 45,653 
HIC
  0.818 
Very 
high
1,000 
(0.32%) 
N Y N/N  
Venezuela 316.482 10,810 
Upper
MIC
12.9% 
3.7 million 
44.8 0.748 
High
1,000-
4,500 
44 Y N/N  
Source: Author’s own compilation 
2. Implications of reconfiguring the development architecture 
New categorisation: a Northern push? 

19  Source: National Poverty Centre, February 2012. 
20  Diverse estimates Alden / le Pere 2010; Braude / Thandrayan / Sidiropoulos 2008; Grimm 2011; Vick-
ers 2012 – varying depending on the definition of development aid and what is included in such. 
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Defining a new category of development partners as ‘emerging economies’ is a fairly 
sensitive undertaking because in essence it is about reconfiguring the global development 
architecture.21 Such new categorisation has implications and consequences for middle-
income countries as it often leads them, on the one hand, to receive less aid and, on the 
other, to be expected to adopt more responsibilities in world affairs. Politically speaking in 
fact, none of these countries, including China (the second largest economy in the world), 
want to be highlighted as ‘emerging powers’ or a ‘donor’ country (Atwood 2012)22. They 
still firmly believe that they are developing countries for all the reasons discussed above. 
Having a unified and big constituency of countries from the South including large econo-
mies (in the G77 for example) provides stronger bargaining power in the UN, WTO and 
other international negotiations.
The strongest push to stratify the developing world into low-income countries and ‘emerg-
ing economies’ originates mostly from DAC countries and traditional Northern donors23.
The OECD has singled out, for example, China, Indonesia, South Africa, Brazil and India 
as the ‘key partners’ (K5) for ‘enhanced engagement’, and Germany has identified Brazil, 
India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa as its ‘global development partners’ (BMZ 
2011). These are also the similar group of countries included in the ‘outreach five’ coun-
tries of the G8, proposed by France and the United Kingdom. This allows traditional do-
nors to treat these countries with a diversified approach. The concept of ‘emerging 
economies’ is in fact a construct discussed more in Northern circles (academic, govern-
mental and corporate) than put forth by the actual countries in question. The following 
section will discuss the possible political motivations and implications behind this drive. 
Closing the aid taps to middle-income countries (MICs) 
In 2008 the United States, the largest economic power in the world, suffered an unprece-
dented financial crisis followed by a serious debt crisis that affected the entire Eurozone. 
This has led to austerity measures across the OECD countries, cuts in public spending, and 
thus also to a decrease in ODA budgets24. ‘The pie has shrunk and cannot feed anymore 
everyone.’25 An elderly German factory worker might struggle to accept that in these 
difficult times his tax money should be spent on providing aid to his competitors in emerg-
ing economies.26 This has intensified the debate among traditional donors around the con-
cept of ‘selectivity’ where aid budgets are reduced or eliminated completely for middle-
income countries in favour of prioritising the poorest low-income countries. This has been 
clear, for example, in the ‘differentiation’ policy of the European Union’s Agenda for 
Change (Herbert 2013; Koch 2012), or by the recent announcement of UK DFID minister 
to cut direct aid to South Africa by 201527, or Germany’s decision to end bilateral devel-

21  From an interview with a diplomat from a BRICS country, June 2013. 
22  Based also on interviews with various Chinese officials and academics. 
23  Views of various diplomats from BRICS and OECD countries, interviewed in Paris, Brussels, Bonn and 
Pretoria, June-July 2013. 
24  See http://www.oecd.org/dac/aft/43234753.pdf.
25  Words of a Southern diplomat engaged in development cooperation, June 2013. 
26  Example provided by Thomas Fues at the workshop of ‘Development Agencies in Emerging Powers’ in 
Mexico City, August 2013. 
27  See BBC World article of 1 May 2013 available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22348326. 
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opment cooperation with China by 201428. These policies underestimate the poverty, ine-
quality and development challenges of most middle-income countries, discussed in the 
previous section, and assume that such countries are able to take care of their poor with 
their own resources.
Most of the middle-income countries on the other hand have made it clear that ODA is 
still welcome and appreciated, to be used in targeted areas and types of interventions, 
involving more technical assistance rather than financial. The South African government, 
for instance, has indicated that, though constituting less than 1% of the national budget, 
ODA is a useful discretionary supplementary resource which can be used with more flexi-
bility to do experimental work, pilot new ideas, unlock bottlenecks, improve service deliv-
ery and leverage other domestic resources, and thus useful for value-add, risk-taking, 
innovation and knowledge transfer (South Africa National Treasury 2010; Besharati 
2013b). As in South Africa, in most emerging markets, ODA represents a tiny fraction of 
development finance, and this therefore gives more negotiating power to the recipient 
country, promoting a more horizontal type of relationship with its development partners. 
Not being in a life or death aid-dependency situation, middle-income countries are better 
able to oppose conditionality pressures from Northern donors, and set the rules of the 
game for their development cooperation better. The Indian government, for example, to 
reduce fragmentation and transaction costs, has decided to work with donors only provid-
ing above US $25 million in ODA, driving out many of the smaller donors to direct their 
efforts elsewhere (Chaturvedi 2012). 
Graduation to becoming a middle-income country does not mean that development coop-
eration with traditional donors stops completely. In fact this is usually just ‘redefined’ 
through other approaches and modalities. Grant-based giving is transformed into more 
loans, concessional or non-concessional (or a blend of the two), technical cooperation, 
dialogue and exchange (Besharati 2011, 2012c, 2013b; BMZ 2011). The bulk of the assis-
tance from traditional donors to middle-income countries tends to focus on priority con-
cerns such as climate change, trade, migration, security and combating crime and traffick-
ing29.
Although governments might not require ODA anymore, aid to civil society in middle-
income countries can still play a very important role in assisting NGOs to provide services 
to the most vulnerable and marginalised members of society, where the government is not 
able to reach. Aid to CSOs can also contribute to the advocacy and watchdog role of civil 
society organisation (CSOs) in the promotion of democracy, accountability and human 
rights. This approach is the one followed by the USAID model of aid provision (Herbert 
2013; Besharati 2013b). 
Additional expectations for emerging economies 
The general trend observed from traditional donors has been a shift from doing develop-
ment cooperation ‘in’ middle-income countries to doing it ‘with’ middle-income coun-
tries. Industrialised countries increasingly seek the support of emerging economies in 
addressing global challenges, delivering on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 

28  See http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/countries_regions/asien/china/index.html?follow=adword.
29  Illustrated in particular in aid to Latin American countries like Mexico, Colombia and Brazil. 
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(and the post-2015 agenda) and in the provision of global and regional public goods (such 
as environmental protection, peace and security, stability of financial markets.) (BMZ 
2011). The renewed, more equal relationship of ‘partnership’ encourages more exchange 
on a cultural, diplomatic and commercial basis. The trend has also been that such middle-
income countries have been used as pivot/anchor countries in trilateral cooperation in 
support of a third low-income country in the developing world (BMZ 2013). Being often 
called to cost-share expenses of domestic and international development interventions 
with DAC donors, middle-income countries have more to say in setting the terms of the 
co-cooperation arrangements. 
A common suspicion shared by many emerging powers (Atwood 2012) is that, with their 
graduation to their new ‘status’, they not only receive less aid but are also under great 
pressure to share with traditional donors the burden of responsibilities (and costs) of inter-
national development.30 It is thus not surprising that the title of one of the recent strategy 
papers (2012) of German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) 
was entitled ‘Shaping globalization - expanding partnerships - sharing responsibility’. 
The North has a large amount of old commitments still unfulfilled, which for some coun-
tries stem from historical responsibilities for redressing colonial and post-colonial exploi-
tation. Southern diplomats have emphasised that North-South cooperation (NSC) stems 
from a moral duty that industrialised countries have towards the developing world of shar-
ing a part of their surplus and wealth (Atwood 2012), while SSC is undertaken in a spirit 
of solidarity, friendship and voluntary sharing of experiences among peers31. Such new 
Southern providers are thus extremely cautious to avoid that the historical responsibilities 
of DAC donors are not slackened, diluted or brushed under the carpet because of the spec-
tacular economic rise of the South against the backdrop of financial crisis in the North 
(Bhatia 2013b).32 SSC certainly has a role to play in global development but it cannot 
substitute or diminish the commitments made and the responsibilities held by traditional 
donors33. These sentiments have also been pungently captured in the recent statement of 
South African President Jacob Zuma at the 68th UN General Assembly meeting34:
“We also wish to emphasize that any development agenda beyond 2015 must be 
based on the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in order to 
equalize the international playing field. We raise this point out of concern be-
cause it appears that the global economic meltdown has brought about new de-
velopments that are detrimental to the developing world, especially Africa. Some 
of the new developments include the tendency to renegotiate the rules of the 
game… We wish to emphasize as well our expectations that the developed North 
and developing South should continue to engage in a genuine partnership. In 
this regard, the developed North should stand ready to meet their commitment to 
contribute 0.7% of their gross national income towards Official Development 

30  Concerns emerged from interviews with diplomats and academics from several BRICS countries. 
31  Based on interviews with Brazilian, Indian and South African diplomats between June and July 2013. 
32  Based on interviews and remarks from government representatives of several BRICS countries in Addis 
Ababa, Delhi, Bonn and Paris during the course of 2013. 
33  Based on remarks made by Dinesh Bhatia, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Relations, Government 
of India, at the UNDCF Symposium in Addis Ababa, 7 June 2013, and at the Conference of Southern 
Providers in New Delhi, 16 April 2013. 
34  New York (24 September 2013) - Full speech available at http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2013/ 
jzum0924.html. 
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Assistance… The tendency to attempt to delegate some of these historical re-
sponsibilities to new emerging economies in the South is unacceptable and un-
workable as such emerging nations have their own historical challenges and 
backlogs to deal with.” 
3. The post-2015 development agenda: how to foot the bill? 
The discussion around the what-agenda of international development cooperation is cap-
tured in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the post-2015 development plan 
that will follow them. These are huge topics that require a separate treatment and can only 
be dealt with very marginally in this paper. Much analysis has already been allotted to the 
strengths and weaknesses of the MDGs and to what lessons can feed into the post-2015 
development planning process (UN High Level Panel of Eminent Persons 2013). The 
following section will thus focus on the views of emerging economies on these processes, 
and how this relates to the debates around ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ 
(CBDR). 
Lopsided responsibilities 
Except for some potential divergences on the climate change debates35, developing and 
industrialised countries should not have much difficulty agreeing to work together for a 
better, safer, healthier world with less poverty and inequality, where everyone enjoys 
employment, freedom, peace and prosperity. The UN global development debates (MDGs 
and post-2015) is where most countries, as politically apart they might be, will find com-
mon grounds. But the devil will be in the detail. The more important questions will be how
the new global plan will be implemented, what will be the enablers and, more fundamen-
tally, how will it be financed and who will be responsible for delivering which new com-
mitments? 
The previous MDGs were to a large extent pre-cooked by the United Nations and the 
donor community before the Millennium Summit36, but eventually significant weight was 
placed on the shoulders of developing countries, responsible for implementing goals 1 to 
7. MDG 8, on the other hand, that required serious political commitment and called for the 
support of wealthy countries to make important contributions in areas of aid, trade, debt 
relief, information and communications technology (ICT), medicine and technology was 
more fuzzy, scattered and problematic. As opposed to the other 7 goals, MDG 8 had a 
very poor monitoring system (UN High Level Panel of Eminent Persons, 2013), weak 
quantifiable indicators and no benchmark, thus making it more difficult to measure per-
formance and hold industrialised countries to account. 
While any future global plan will need everyone to play a role in ensuring the well-being 
of the entire human family and the preservation of our common planet, each nation’s con-

35  Already clear from the Rio+20 and Durban COP17 debates. 
36  Just before the historical Millennium Summit, the OECD, the UN, the World Bank and the IMF had put 
forward a report called ‘A Better World for All’ which proposed a framework of goals almost identical 
to what became the Millennium Development Goals. These were in large part based on commitments 
made at various major UN conferences in the 1990s as well as the international development goals pro-
posed by the DAC in the 1996 document ‘Shaping the 21st Century’.
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tribution will have to be commensurate to its capacities, histories and specific circum-
stances (UN High Level Panel of Eminent Persons, 2013). Every country, whether rich or 
poor, will have its own needs as well as experiences to contribute. The next global devel-
opment plan needs to shift from a country-focused approach to a people-centred approach 
(Glennie 2011; Sumner 2012a/b). Every country has its poor, vulnerable and marginalised, 
and at the same time different types of intellectual and material resources. Thus, all need 
to be mobilised in order to protect the planet, reduce poverty and advance together as a 
unified global civilisation. 
How is development financed? 
The previous model for financing the MDGs was heavily based on a twentieth century 
North-South aid paradigm. In other words, international development targets were to be 
achieved through developed countries boosting their ODA to the developing world and to 
the multilateral agencies (Sachs 2005). Experts had calculated that no less than US $100 
billion every year would be required to meet the MDGs (UNDP 2003). Over the last dec-
ade OECD donors channelled increasing amounts of their funding to social sectors high-
lighted in the MDGs through bilateral aid or through vertical funds such as the Global 
Fund37 and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). 
Today however ODA is dwarfed when compared to other sources of financing to the de-
veloping countries (see Hudson Institute 2012; Greenhill / Prizzon / Rogerson 2013; 
Lundsgaarde 2013; Besharati 2012b, Besharati, 2013a), such as climate financing, philan-
thropy, remittances, corporate social investments (particularly from the extractive indus-
tries). ODA does not have the same prominence it had in the past anymore with regards to 
financing global development. There is now a wide range of technical and financial assis-
tance flows to developing countries which needs to be aligned to receiving-country devel-
opment priorities and better reported in a transparent manner. Development cooperation is 
not only about money but also about the exchange between countries of people, goods, 
ideas and technology. 
The global development discourse of the past few years has emphasised concepts such as 
‘development effectiveness’ (Kindornay / Shannon / Morton 2009) and ‘policy coherence 
for development’ (PCD), or the systematic promotion of parallel and reinforcing policy 
actions across government departments and agencies in order to achieve increased devel-
opment results for poor countries38. Notions of PCD and development effectiveness have 
particularly resonated in the South, with examples such as the African Platform for Devel-
opment Effectiveness (2011). 
Within such frameworks, aid to developing countries is always welcome and Northern 
donors are urged to uphold historical commitments such as contributing 0.7% of their 
gross national income (GNI) to ODA. However more significant development gains can 
occur when aid efforts are coupled with the promotion of peace and stability, the removal 
of trade barriers, the creation of an enabling environment for private investment, the pro-
motion of good governance, rule of law and transparency, local economic development 
through infrastructure and small and medium enterprise (SME) development, support to 

37  To fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. 
38  See, for instance, http://www.oecd.org/development/pcd/50461952.pdf. 
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migrants and reducing costs of remittance transfers, relaxing intellectual property laws to 
assist access to medicine and technology in favour of developing countries – to name just 
a few of the many simultaneous actions that need to take place to facilitate holistic devel-
opment processes . Within the ‘development effectiveness’ discourse, African institu-
tions39 have also been advocating for more attention to be given to domestic resource 
mobilisation, improving taxation and financial management system, building institutional 
capacities and fighting corruption and illegal capital flows. This is why SSC partners have 
looked at development cooperation beyond just the provision of ODA, to include coopera-
tion between developing countries within the broader prism of trade, investment and infra-
structure development. 
Already at the Monterrey Conference (2002) the primacy of domestic resource mobilisa-
tion was established as the main financier of development. This is even truer today. A 
recent ODI report (Greenhill / Prizzon / Rogerson 2013) has highlighted that, particularly 
in middle-income countries, domestic taxation and customs revenue constitutes the over-
whelming share of the development financing of the nation. The sheer size of the popula-
tion of emerging economies also has a large impact on consumer consumption, energy, 
food requirements, and of course the environmental footprint. During the MDG campaign 
the biggest gains in reducing global poverty can be attributed to the economic growth that 
occurred in India and China alone (United Nations 2013; Hackenesch / Janus 2013). This 
gives an indication that, even in the post-2015 campaign, the biggest contribution that 
middle-income countries can make to any future global development agenda would be to 
focus on their own national development40.
4. South-South cooperation: different narratives, paradigms and functions 
In the previous section we have seen how a major contribution that middle-income coun-
tries provide to global development is through their own poverty-reduction endeavours 
within their territories. Nevertheless, do emerging economies also have a role to play in 
assisting other countries? The answer is South-South cooperation (SSC) - broadly defined 
as the exchange of resources, technology, skills and technical know-how among countries 
of the South to promote development – social, economic, cultural, political and scientific 
(Besharati 2012c). Just as there is no uniform approach to North-South development co-
operation, SSC is also extremely heterogeneous and different Southern partners approach 
the provision of assistance to their neighbours and peers in very different ways. The topic 
of South-South cooperation, its diverse forms, features, modalities, actors, sectorial and 
geographic focus, niche expertise and comparative strengths have been extensively treated 
in numerous publications of the United Nations and by many Northern and Southern 
scholars41. For this reason this section will focus on highlighting the ‘polarized ideological 
divide’ (Atwood 2012) that argues that the origins, conceptual paradigms, financial vol-
umes and approaches of SSC are essentially different from those of North-South coopera-

39  See, for example, remarks by the Nigerian Minister of Finance, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, at various 
GPEDC steering committee meetings, as well as key priorities of the African Consensus (AU-NEPAD 
2011). 
40  Based on interviews conducted in 2013 with various academics from China, India and South Africa. 
41  See, for instance, works of Alden, Alves, Besharati, Chaturvedi, De Mello e Souza, Grimm, Huang, 
Milani, Perez Pineda, Naidu, Fues, Schulz, Sidiropoulos, Wajjwalku, Xiaoyun, to name just a few. 
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tion (NSC), and thus cannot be put on the same level field in terms of roles and responsi-
bilities in global development processes. 
Differing historical journeys 
NSC and SSC have evolved over the last six decades under two parallel but very different 
historical narratives. NSC generally suffers from a historical legacy that links it to colonial 
and post-colonial dependency relations between the industrialised North and the poverty-
stricken South. The roots of SSC, on the other hand, are found in the solidarity politics and 
alliances pursued by newly independent states in Asia and Africa, along with their coun-
terparts in Latin America, during the Cold War. Concerned that the dominant bipolar poli-
tics of the day would undermine efforts to achieve economic development and sustain 
political unity, they came together in Bandung in 1955 to set out an agenda that, under the 
auspices of the Non-Aligned Movement created six years later, would lay the foundation 
for coordinated action in the decades to come (Alden / Morphet / Vieira 2010).  
With the establishment of the United Nation Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) by the Group of 77 in 1964, a formal institutionalisation of SSC commenced, 
focusing on two aspects in particular - technical cooperation and economic cooperation. 
Subsequent events, such as the UN Conference on Technical Cooperation among Devel-
oping Countries (TCDC) convened in Argentina in 1978, sought to refine the areas of 
cooperation. The Buenos Aires Action Plan (BAPA), which emerged out of this meeting, 
produced more specific terms of reference, policy guidelines and procedures for technical 
cooperation among developing countries. In the same year, the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) established a special unit for SSC. 
Since then numerous G77 and UN meetings and conferences (including the most recent 
Nairobi Conference in 2009) have been held, and UNDESA has been providing support to 
this movement within the context of the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum 
(UNDCF). But it was not until the 21st century that the concept gained more interest in 
OECD circles when Southern powers like China, India and Brazil rose to new heights and 
increased their economic engagements with fellow developing countries in Africa and in 
their regions. The moral formal convergence of North-South cooperation and South-South 
cooperation started around the HLF-3 in Accra, which will be discussed later in the paper. 
Incomparable financial envelops 
With all the warranted enthusiasm for the new emerging economies, the magnitude of 
SSC is often exaggerated and overhyped within academic and political circles. The inter-
national development industry (both governmental and non-governmental) is in fact cur-
rently estimated to be managing over US $200 billion every year42 in assistance to poor 
countries. We have seen previously the large amounts of flows to developing countries 
which occur through corporate social investments and remittances, but even charities, 
philanthropy, churches and non-governmental organisations channel between UD $50-60 
billion dollars every year to poor countries (Hudson Institute 2008-2012). According to 
the latest UN estimates, global volumes of SSC currently reach US $13-15 billion a year 

42  Rough estimate based on adding US $129 billion DAC ODA (OECD 2013c) + US $15 billion SSC 
flows (UN-DESA 2010) + US $56 billion global private philanthropy (Hudson Institute 2012). 
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(UNDESA 2010), which is still quite miniscule compared to the US $120-130 billion a 
year of ODA provided by DAC donors43. It would therefore be inappropriate to place the 
same levels of expectations on SSC as on North-South Cooperation in terms of impact, or 
to see SSC as an adjunct, supplement or substitution of traditional aid (Bhatia 2013; Nai-
robi Outcome Document 2009). Financing from middle-income countries to global devel-
opment is barely 5% of all other flows. However, the analysis of financial flows from 
industrialised and emerging economies to the developing world could maybe provide 
another picture if trade, investment and remittances were also included in the equation 
(Alden / Alves 2008; Roodman 2003) 
Volumes aside, contributions of emerging economies to international development are 
nevertheless appreciated and well-received by host countries44. Recipient countries now 
have more options to choose from and more diversity in the range of development pack-
ages, modalities and types of collaborations they can forge with various different external 
partners. SSC also expresses itself in areas of peace-keeping, humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief (Perez Pineda 2009; Chaturvedi / Fues / Sidiropoulos 2012) and many coun-
tries such as Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile and South Africa contribute a 
significant portion of their aid (at times between 40% and 90%) through multilateral chan-
nels (Alves 2013a; IPEA 2013; Figueroa 2013), thus highlighting their important role in 
the delivery of regional and global public goods. 
Charity versus mutuality 
It would be naïve to assume that development aid is provided on purely altruistic basis. No 
donor is in Africa to just provide charity. Development cooperation (from the North or the 
South) is almost always linked to other national interests whether economic, political, 
strategic, commercial or diplomatic. While NSC was less direct in expressing its manifold 
motives, SSC is a bit more explicit in its strategic objectives. 
Under the umbrella of ‘mutual gain’, development engagements between countries of the 
South are more open about interests, as long as both parties benefit in some way or from 
the cooperation arrangements45. For emerging powers, Africa is not seen as a gloomy 
continent, a basket-case of problems, which necessitates help, but rather as a land of op-
portunities where new ‘business’ relations can be established. Investing in infrastructure, 
economic development and political capital on the continent will provide important re-
turns from access to raw materials, the opening of upcoming markets and will open doors 
for future types of cooperation. For China, South Africa and other emerging powers, 
building ‘bridges and roads’ into Africa not only has a symbolic function but also a very 
practical one. Brazilian and Indian development contributions in Northern Mozambique, 
such as the rehabilitation of the Pro-Savana corridor, the railway system and the deep-
water port of Nacala, are not only useful for the economic development of Mozambique, 
but also good for the businesses operations of Southern mining giants such as Vale do Rio 

43  See OECD reports and trends - http://webnet.oecd.org/dcdgraphs/ODAhistory/. 
44  Based on a telephone interview with a representative from the African Forum and Network on Debt and 
Development (AFRODAD) (Zimbabwe) and the Rwanda Ministry of Finance in June 2013, as well as 
results from the 4th round of the Afrobarometer survey (2008) available at http://www.afrobarometer. 
org/. 
45  From a focus group discussion held with Northern and Southern academics at the Centre for Global 
Cooperation Research, Duisburg, June 2013. 
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Doce and Jindal Steal (Besharati 2012b). Thus SSC is often undertaken with a sense of 
‘enlightened self-interest’ acknowledging that assisting neighbours and other developing 
countries will also contribute in the long run to one’s own national growth. Already in the 
days of Mandela, South Africa, for instance, realised that it could never survive within 
Africa as ‘an island of prosperity within a sea of poverty’ (Nelson Mandela 1998, quoted 
in Besharati 2013b). 
This reciprocity and win-win situation is the foundation of SSC. SSC distinguishes itself 
from NSC as a ‘two-way horizontal collaboration of equals’ rather than a ‘one way chari-
table relationships of aid’ (Besharati 2012a). The type of cooperation developing countries 
would maintain would be similar to a political/economic partnership between France and 
Germany or the United States and Japan. Middle-income countries thus very vehemently 
oppose using the word ‘aid’ and calling themselves ‘donors’. The South African govern-
ment refers to its cooperation as ‘partnership’ and ‘ubuntu’ (Besharati 2013b; Department 
of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) 2011), Brazil as ‘friendship’, China 
as ‘gifts’ (Xiaoyun / Guoliang 2009). In the rhetoric associated to South-South partner-
ships, words such as solidarity, brotherhood, trust, equality, reciprocity, peer exchange and 
mutual learning are often present (Besharati 2012c). That said, one may question if an 
economic giant like China and a small land-locked, low-income country like Lesotho can 
really enter a development partnership on an equal footing? 
In part also due to the small volumes of their assistance, Southern providers are usually 
less concerned with development results in the same way that traditional donors are. The 
focus is in fact more on building political and commercial relations. SSC is actually most 
of the time managed by ministries of foreign affairs and used as a diplomatic instrument to 
address other foreign policy concerns, such as security, and trade and migration, or to gain 
support in multilateral forums. Nevertheless, even if they do not apply ‘policy condition-
alities’ in the same way as the North does, it would be incorrect to say that South-South 
development cooperation was done on a completely selfless basis. Even the mere fact of 
being selective in terms of which areas to work in and which countries to support implies 
that a certain level of strategic priorities are also present among Southern providers. In 
some countries such as China (and soon also in Brazil46), development cooperation is 
managed by the Ministry of Commerce which gives an even stronger indication of the 
important link in the South between development cooperation, trade, investment and other 
national economic imperatives. 
Demand-driven versus prescriptive conditionalities 
A principle which is highly emphasised in discourse on SSC is that assistance must be 
‘demand-driven’ and tailored to the recipient’s needs (Chaturvedi 2012). As opposed to 
development cooperation approaches of traditional donors, SSC endeavours to not be 
predefined, prescriptive or to attach conditionalities to it (Bhatia 2013a). The historical 
roots of SSC have in fact emphasised the importance of respect for sovereignty, non-
interference in national affairs (Nairobi Outcome Document, 2009), while NSC was often 
accompanied by policy conditionalities linked to democracy, human rights, governance 

46  In a recent talk, President Dilma Rousseff announced that Brazil will restructure its development coop-
eration agency, possibly bringing its technical and economic cooperation together in a more substantial 
cooperation programme led by the Ministry of Trade indicating possibly a more commercial and strate-
gic drive to Brazil’s cooperation (De Mello e Souza 2013). 
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reform, rule of law and economic liberalisation. South-South partnerships on the other 
hand encourage the concept of independence, self-reliance, and that recipient countries 
need to have the space to define their own policies, have ownership and leadership of their 
development process, and set the priorities of the development assistance they wish to 
receive47.
This concept however also has it shortfalls. As demonstrated by the experiences of South 
Africa and Brazil, the heavy emphasis on demand-driven cooperation and the ad-hoc pro-
vision of development projects stemming from diplomatic engagements and state visits, 
has sometimes led to a fragmented, scattered and thus ineffective international program-
ming portfolio (Besharati 2013b; De Mello e Souza 2013; Arda 2013). Entering a devel-
opment partnership with no clear priorities and responding to ad-hoc requests from part-
ners has meant that at times soccer stadiums and presidential palaces were built48 instead 
of hospitals and schools. 
While being flexible and adaptable to the needs of recipient countries, Southern providers 
still need to ‘communicate’ what they can offer49 and where their comparative strengths 
and experiences lie. Thus the development programmes offered in the Forum for China-
Africa Collaboration (FOCAC) or in the India-Africa Forum need to be assessed and 
compared to the development packages offered by DAC donors, so that ultimately partner 
countries can ‘pick and choose’, ‘take or leave’ what they find useful for their national 
development processes. This likewise implies accepting the ‘conditions’ attached to the 
aid package, whether these may be adopting some governance reforms or recognising ‘one 
China’ in UN fora50.
5. Evidence deficit in South-South cooperation 
Heroes or rogues? 
The previous section has already started to highlight some of the tensions that lie in the 
current debates around SSC. Policy-makers, academics, media, civil society and the gen-
eral public are divided in their views with regards to the new emerging donors in the de-
velopment landscape, with most of the disputes centred on the role of China in Africa. 
Many believe that the emergence of new development players is a positive signal that 
allows developing countries more access to development financing and more mechanisms, 
modalities and approaches to cooperation. Traditional partners, in both trade and aid, are 
losing their monopoly as they are ‘priced out’ (Naim 2007) by the competition coming 
from the new emerging partners who often provide assistance in a faster, cheaper and 
more flexible manner (UNDESA 2010). As a result, in recent years a great deal of West-

47  From an interview with various African Ministry of Finance officials in September 2012 and August 
2013. 
48  There are multiple examples of such types of project in Chinese and South African development coop-
eration activities. 
49  Comments of Mehmet Arda at the workshop on ‘Development Agencies in Emerging Powers’ in Mexi-
co City, August 2013. 
50  From a focus group discussion held with Northern and Southern academics at the Centre for Global 
Cooperation Research, Duisburg, June 2013. 
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ern criticism has surfaced on the quality of services, safety and environmental standards, 
labour practices, and lack of transparency51 in the operations of ‘Asian donors and inves-
tors’ in Africa, depicted as being rapacious and mercantilist (Holslag 2006) in their ap-
proach to the continent and its natural resources52. Some commentators such as Naim 
(2007) have characterised some of the major Southern donors such as China, Venezuela, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia as providing ‘rogue aid’ to corrupt and autocratic regimes, thus under-
mining important governance reforms which traditional donors have been trying to push 
forward through their international development policy. History nevertheless shows that 
this is not much different from the support which Northern countries such as the United 
States, Russia, Great Britain and France provided in the past to dictators and corrupt lead-
ers in exchange for short-term favours. One is thus left to wonder if emerging donors are 
‘saints or devils in disguise’53, like their counterparts in the North? 
Although SSC has been widely discussed for the past decades in many academic and po-
litical fora, the debate sometimes suffers from overtones of political ideology (Atwood 
2012) and ‘emotionally-loaded messages’54. It is not always clear how much the general 
rhetoric is translated into reality on the ground. One can take neither the positive nor the 
negative opinions on the role of emerging donors at face value. Views on SSC are in fact 
not firmly grounded in evidence but tend to reflect perceptions and political stances. In 
fact, not much empirical research has been undertaken on the real contribution of SSC to 
development outcomes so far. Is SSC any better than traditional North-South cooperation? 
There is a serious gap in evidence in the discourse that needs to be addressed not only 
through monitoring and evaluation but through more rigorous scientific analysis. Without 
sound evidence, learning and future improvements become very difficult and the SSC 
debate will continue to remain at the rhetorical level. 
Getting the numbers right! 
As a start, the exact magnitude of resources for development coming from the South is not 
at all clear. UNDESA has done some useful analytical work around SSC through the In-
ternational Development Cooperation Reports and the background studies prepared for the 
2008 and 2010 UNDCF reports. Many, nevertheless, disagree with the UNDESA figures. 
Different expert papers and reports present very large variations in the calculations of 
volumes of development cooperation from the various emerging economies55. This is due 
to several problems. 
Firstly, to measure South-South development cooperation there needs to be a common 
definition and interpretations, which can be applied when aggregating figures from the 
various emerging partners. While generally disagreeing with the DAC definition of ODA 

51  Comments from an Afrodad representative in a telephone interview (June 2013) at the BRICS Summit 
side-event in Durban (March 2013). 
52  See also http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/apr/02/china-aid-africa- 
development. 
53  Sentence used by one of the diplomats engaged in international development cooperation discourse, 
from an email feedback received in September 2013. 
54  From the address of Talat Abdel-Malek (Egyptian diplomat) at the High Level Conference on South-
South Cooperation held in Bogota in 2010. 
55  See, for instance, large discrepancies in figures for the development cooperation of India and South 
Africa (Chaturvedi 2012; Alden / le Pere 2010; Braude et al. 2008; Grimm 2011; Vickers 2012). 
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(discussed in previous section), most Southern providers apply different criteria to meas-
ure their development cooperation. We have seen earlier the challenges of monetising the 
technical cooperation from the emerging donors, qualifying the Chinese and Indian loans 
and credit lines, or the South African peace-keeping and customs budget support, as Offi-
cial Development Assistance. Depending on how much technical and financial coopera-
tion is included, figures relating to the aid from Southern partners can vary enormously. 
At the core of the evaluation challenge is thus a conceptual challenge where debates are 
still ongoing whether development cooperation is a part of SSC or SSC is part of devel-
opment cooperation?56
Another factor contributing to the information deficits in SSC is in the way development 
cooperation is managed. In almost all emerging donors, development assistance to third 
nations is provided by numerous different ministries, public entities, agencies, state-owned 
enterprises and academic institutions (Braude /Thandrayan /Sidiropoulos 2008; 
Chaturvedi / Fues / Sidiropoulos 2012; De Mello e Souza 2013; Huang 2013). Often these 
middle-income countries do not possess an over-arching development cooperation frame-
work and a central agency to coordinate all foreign assistance from the countries’ institu-
tions to other developing countries (Besharati 2013b; Chaturvedi 2012). As a result, dif-
ferent types of data are produced by each entity following different M&E systems, report-
ing formats, standards and time-frames, thus making it difficult to produce aggregate fig-
ures and account properly for all the outgoing development assistance. 
As a consequence, transparency and rigor in reporting development cooperation is ex-
tremely weak among the emerging donors (Besharati 2012c; De Mello e Souza 2013; UN-
ECOSOC, 2008; Santiso 2001). All these challenges in data management, monitoring and 
evaluation, and statistics on South-South development cooperation have been widely ac-
knowledged and discussed at many recent conferences such as Nairobi (2009), Bogota 
(2010), and New Delhi (2013). Several Southern governments and academics are endeav-
ouring to address these technical issues, however a political dimension to the problem also 
exists. Some middle-income countries are reluctant to publicise the exact figures of their 
foreign aid, as this may have repercussions in connection to their delicate cooperation 
arrangements with other countries as well as their domestic stakeholders and tax-payers, 
who may question why money is being spent in other parts of the world when there were 
so much poverty and so many problems at home to be addressed first (Grimm 2011; 
Besharati 2013b; Hackenesch / Janus 2013). 
Evaluating impact and effectiveness 
When basic monitoring and the collection of simple development cooperation information 
are weak or unavailable, it becomes even more difficult to conduct more complex analyti-
cal work. Almost all Southern providers have poor monitoring and evaluation systems57.
Annual reports from emerging donors tend to focus more on low-level administrative data 
on inputs, activities, missions, and people involved, and sometimes on immediate outputs 
(such as hospitals built, how many kilometres of roads have been constructed, etc.). Most 

56  Question raised by Elizabeth Sidiropoulos at the workshop of ‘Development Agencies in Emerging 
Powers’ in Mexico City, August 2013. 
57  Similar issues raised by all authors at the workshop of ‘Development Agencies in Emerging Powers’ in 
Mexico City, August 2013. 
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of the evaluations are qualitative, subjective, anecdotal and reflect perceptions and politi-
cal stances. Less attention is put on assessing outcome, quality, sustainability, efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
Although many low-income and middle-income countries have conducted interesting 
randomised controlled trials on their own national policies and programmes58, not many 
rigorous impact evaluations are conducted on SSC initiatives and projects they are sup-
porting in other countries. This is in part due to the fact that SSC activities tend to be rela-
tively small to justify the prohibitive cost of complex impact assessments. Also, as men-
tioned above, much of the SSC is not so centred around development results but rather 
around strategic political and economic relationship-building. This is also reflected by the 
fact that most of the officials in emerging economies engaged in development partnerships 
tend to be diplomatic personnel rather that development practitioners (Cabral, 2010 
Besharati 2013b). 
Finally when assessing processes, quality and effectiveness of SSC, it is necessary to have 
clear criteria and norms of ‘good practices’ against which development assistance from 
different partners can be measured. Southern providers generally do not agree with the 
standards and criteria developed by the OECD-DAC, which they find difficult to report 
against and they do not find appropriate for judging their unique type of cooperation. But, 
at the same time, there are no internationally agreed norms and parameters for SSC. Such 
norms and parameters would be required if any type of quality and effectiveness assess-
ment of the development interventions of Southern providers is to be carried out. These 
issues will be expanded further in the next section. 
6. Standards, monitoring and peer review
The need for accountability 
In the arena of development cooperation, accountability comes from many angles. There 
is vertical accountability between donors and recipients; there is tripartite domestic ac-
countability between the government, civil society and the private sector within one coun-
try (Kharas 2012); and there is ‘mutual accountability’ between development partners. 
Accountability comes from donors and tax-payers, who want to make sure they get the 
‘best value’ for their investments and that their contributions are effectively spent to 
maximise the intended results. At the same time, beneficiaries also wish to ensure that 
they reap the greatest benefits possible from the external assistance they are receiving. 
When it comes to oversight mechanisms, national accountability systems can be extremely 
powerful, as development partners have a moral and sometimes legal obligation to follow 
the rules of the country in which they operate. Having said that, domestic accountability 
systems require capacities to be in place and are usually built around international regimes 
that have been universally agreed within global fora. 

58  See, for instance, impact evaluations of PROGRESA in Mexico (Behrman et al. 2005); Bolsa Familha 
and Bolsa Escola in Brazil (Glewwe / Kassouf 2010); child/women nutritional programmes in Sri Lanka 
(White 2009); Dinaledi schools initiative in South Africa (World Bank 2010). 
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In international relations there are no legally binding commitments and enforcement 
mechanisms as there are at the level of sovereign states. However monitoring and peer 
review are important instruments of global governance that act as ‘soft law’ and exert a 
certain diplomatic pressure between countries (Ashoff 2013). Reporting on global norms 
and peer reviews provides countries with incentives, pride and shame, to honour commit-
ments and positively vie with one another, as they are ranked on performance based on 
compliance with the global standards. Global monitoring and peer reviews are hence very 
useful in promoting mutual accountability, learning and improvement in the development 
cooperation system. 
For peer reviews to be effective they need to engage the highest levels of political powers 
and clear roles, rights and responsibilities need to be assigned to the various parties in-
volved. It has to be clear who is accountable for what and by when, hence clear targets are 
essential. They also need to be backed up by technically sound monitoring systems that 
use empirical and credible methods of measurement. Relevant indicators are thus critical 
and, with that, also reliable data which can be easily gathered on a timely basis to measure 
progress. Obviously capacities need to be in place among all the partners in order to con-
duct such monitoring and evaluations, and to report transparently to peers and public. And 
lastly, peer reviews can only occur once the community of nations has agreed on the prin-
ciples, standards, criteria and norms upon which they are to be regularly assessed. The 
following section will delve into the currently available international regimes of monitor-
ing and accountability which exist in the development cooperation space. 
The United Nations system 
The UN is obviously the broadest, most legitimate forum where almost all countries of the 
world are represented. The main development framework that currently drives the United 
Nation system is the Millennium Development Goals extracted out of the Millennium 
Summit (2000) which was endorsed by 189 Heads of State. The MDGs are accompanied 
by a set of targets and indicators that are regularly monitored by the various UN agencies 
and national stakeholders and these form the basis of country-level discussions. At the 
global level, periodic events linked to the General Assembly meetings in New York have 
been organised to review progress on the MDGs such as the 2005 World Summit, the 
2008 High Level Meeting, the 2010 Summit, and the MDG review meeting of the General 
Assembly which took place in September 2013. In addition, the ECOSOC’s Annual Min-
isterial Reviews take stock of progress against the MDGs and the ECOSOC’s National 
Voluntary Presentations constitute a soft review of countries’ efforts towards achieving 
the MDGs.59
Previously I have explained how the MDGs framework puts a lot of weight on monitoring 
progress in developing countries. MDG8, which is supposed to capture the role and re-
sponsibilities of developed countries, has however had a poor monitoring and accountabil-
ity framework, and has been criticised for being technically weak and lacking in concrete 
targets and quantifiable indicators (Report by UN High Level Panel of Eminent Persons 
on Post-2015, 2013), and thus also lacking the appropriate political review process to 
make it effective. 

59  See http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/amr/index.shtml, http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/amrnational 
2012.shtml.
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The DAC system 
One of the main components of MDG8 (Global Partnership) has been the need to increase 
ODA flows. In this regard the OECD-DAC has been a much better forum than the United 
Nations in providing accountability, monitoring mechanisms and peer reviews on aid 
flows to the developing world. Following the Monterrey UN Conference on Financing for 
Development (2002) it became clear that, in order to tackle the MDGs effectively, there 
was a need for a regular platform for donors and partners to discuss how to increase the 
quantum and quality of development assistance. This is what led the OECD-DAC to 
spearhead a series of High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness (HLF) in Rome (2003), 
Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011)60, the implications of which on the middle-
income countries will be discussed later in the paper. 
The HLF process aside, OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has gener-
ally been the ‘custodian’ of ODA, as it defines and regulates 90% of the world’s donor 
assistance. From its inception in the early 1960s it has been coordinating the post-war 
development assistance of the United States, France and the United Kingdom and today its 
membership includes 26 donor countries and some of the major multilateral development 
organisations as observers (OECD 2013). Among the functions fulfilled by the DAC is to 
increase the quantity of aid provided by the industrialised world but also the quality and 
effectiveness of such development assistance, by setting standards and norms, sharing 
good practice, providing guidelines, encouraging regular reporting, monitoring compli-
ance, facilitating peer reviews; thus promoting accountability and learning among the 
major traditional donors. It also defines which countries are to be recipients and the terms 
of ODA, and maintains up-to-date records of ODA flows to and from most countries. In 
both the OECD and the DAC, each country has the same vote (regardless of size), and 
most decisions are made by consensus. Thus member-states have a significant role in 
shaping the agenda. 
Ashoff (2013) has elaborated on the quality of the DAC peer review system, highlighting 
its technical rigor and benefits with regard to providing critical and impartial, yet helpful 
and respectful feedback to donor countries. The effectiveness of the DAC peer reviews is 
demonstrated by the fact that many Northern development agencies have implemented 
significant institutional and policy reforms as a result of DAC peer reviews. An example 
has been Germany’s move to merge its scattered technical cooperation implemented 
through various organisations into one agency, the GIZ, in 2010. Similarly, 88% of DAC 
recommendations have been partially or fully implemented (Ashoff 2013). Even the moni-
toring and evaluation system of the Paris Declaration, which encompassed decades of 
DAC aid effectiveness experience, was demonstrated to have contributed to institutional 
and behavioural changes in donor and beneficiary country practices of development coop-
eration (Wood et al. 2011). 
The problem with the DAC system is that it still operates on the 20th century paradigm of 
North-South vertical aid relations in a world where development cooperation is now about 
many other elements as well (see previous discussion on policy coherence for develop-
ment). Although the DAC has led to a great many positive results for the developing 
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60  For more information about the aid effectiveness process, refer to the articles of Besharati (2013a) and 
Bracho Carpizo / Garcia-López (2011). 
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world, most of the South generally regards it as a bastion of Northern hegemony61, the 
‘Paris coffee club of donors’62, and chooses rather to antagonise it instead of engaging 
with it constructively or taking advantage of the opportunities it presents63. This will be 
elaborated further in the paper. 
APRM: a good Southern model 
Peer review is not only an approach common among developed countries, there are also 
some very good models of such monitoring and accountability systems in the South. One 
outstanding example is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which emerged out 
of President Thabo Mbeki’s64 efforts to promote ownership, responsibility and leadership 
in the promotion of good governance and accountability on the continent (Khadiagala 
2013). In the APRM process, African leaders have chosen the norms and standards they 
wish to follow; and have been regularly assessing themselves on performance in relation-
ship to those standards. This allows for important debates to take place at national and 
regional level to encourage policy reforms, even in very sensitive areas such as govern-
ance and human rights. The APRM is built around a detailed set of commitments, stan-
dards and indicators for the four thematic areas of democracy and political governance; 
economic governance and management; corporate governance; and social-economic de-
velopment. 
The APRM has been a very powerful instrument for peer learning, dialogue and diplo-
macy catalysing policy reform on the continent and providing a platform for inter-
government and civil society engagement. Since 2003, 33 countries have joined the 
APRM voluntarily, 17 of which have completed the review process. Interesting cases exist 
on how the APRM has contributed to important reforms in Rwanda, Ghana and Kenya 
(Turianskyi 2012). The success of the APRM lies in the fact that it engages the highest 
political leaders of the countries involved (Heads of State) through the APRM Forum, and 
it is an endogenous initiative where the standards set are based on African values, and 
countries are reviewed by African peers and local experts. The breadth of the sensitive 
subjects tackled is unparalleled with issues such as rule of law, individual and collective 
rights, democratic political processes, free and fair elections, separation of powers and 
independence of judiciary being scrutinised (NEPAD, 2002). It is an outstanding example 
of peer review occurring in the South, which rebuts the notion of non-interference with 
non-indifference (Turianskyi 2012). 
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61  Views gathered from many policy-makers, civil society and academics throughout the developing 
world. 
62  Humorous nick-name given to the DAC by some African government officials. 
63  Interview with a middle-income country diplomat in Paris, July 2013. 
64  Of South Africa. 
Neissan Alessandro Besharati
28 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
7. The problematic relationship between the South and the OECD-DAC  
Background and strength of the OECD 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC), previously known as Development As-
sistance Group (DAG), has been hosted since the beginning by the OECD, which provided 
secretarial support to the Committee’s work through its Development Cooperation Direc-
torate (DCD). As a result the DAC, though officially a separate organisation, has always 
been intrinsically associated with the OECD, which also had its roots in the early Organi-
sation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), set up to implement the Marshall 
Plan and supervise the distribution of aid during the post-war reconstruction period. 
It functions as a forum for agreeing on standards and norms, sharing policy experiences, 
identifying good practices and finding answers to common problems (OECD 2013). It 
monitors trends and facilitates different instruments, treaties and peer reviews that allow it 
to implement ‘soft law’ and improve the policies of its member states. At any given time 
around 200 committees65, working groups and expert group discussions are taking place 
dealing with a variety of policy areas such as economics, trade, education, the environ-
ment, taxation, public governance, and social affairs. The OECD is like a ‘mini-UN’, a 
global public good, an international think-tank, serviced by 2,500 staff engaging in in-
depth analytical work and producing guidelines of good practice for countries, which can 
still pick and choose what they find useful for their context66.
As discussed earlier, another important function played by the OECD is that it coordinates 
the domestic and international policies of its members, thus facilitating common positions 
of the industrialised world in bigger multilateral fora, such as the UN, the WTO and the 
Bretton Woods institutions. In this way it is a very important forum for global decision-
making. As it is a much smaller group than the UN and security is not addressed, discus-
sions in the OECD are less politicised and consensus is achieved more quickly. However, 
contrary to popular belief, even the OECD is a very heterogeneous group of nations and at 
times decisions are reached after long and painful negotiations (Atwood 2012) 
The OECD and the South 
Since its establishment in 1961, 34 countries have joined the OECD. Over the years, 
membership to the OECD has included more and more non-European countries, however 
the general expectation is that of ‘like-mindedness’ of its member states. This means in 
practical terms a commitment to democracy, free market economy, and human rights.  
The 34 OECD member states account for 60% of the world’s GDP. OECD countries tend 
to be highly industrialised and high-income economies and therefore it is understandable 
that in international politics the OECD has become tantamount to the Northern industrial-
ised ‘developed’ world. It is however this very reason that has historically caused the 
apprehension by the South towards the OECD as an institution: the organisation is seen as 
the stronghold of ‘Western hegemony’, ‘capitalism’, ‘imperialist and neo-colonial powers’ 
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65  Interview with an OECD official, Paris, July 2013. 
66  From an interview with a diplomat from a K5 country in Paris, July 2013. 
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- the ‘Paris club of rich countries’67. The South and civil society often criticise the OECD 
for being too prescriptive in developing standards and policies which originate from the 
conceptual framework of the North. 
Nonetheless, the OECD is not a stranger to developing countries. Turkey, Greece and 
Ireland have been members of the organisation since 1961, although at that time they were 
all poor nations and recipients of foreign aid. The first major breakthrough however oc-
curred when Mexico joined the OECD in 1994, followed shortly after by South Korea in 
1996. Both countries still feel connected to the Southern tradition, and find themselves ‘in-
between’, that is, part of the developing world but also of the industrialised world. In this 
way they play a brokering role between the North and the South. Arguably both countries’ 
engagement with the OECD can be justified as a function of their close relationship with 
and dependency on the United States as regards to security, migration, trade and economic 
partnership. While their heart is still with the South, both countries had to practically 
withdraw from the G77 when they became members of the OECD. What has however 
been unprecedented in history is Chile’s recent accession (2010) to the OECD, while still 
retaining membership to the G77. This signals a drastic shift from the previous ‘black and 
white’ global political economy that had characterised the development community. Fol-
lowing Chile, other emerging economies are in the pipeline to join the OECD. These in-
clude Costa Rica, Colombia and even Russia, which was once the powerful centre of an-
tagonism to the western neo-liberal block. 
The DAC and the South 
While becoming a member of the OECD is a political statement of the place countries 
want to have in the international development landscape, becoming a member of the DAC 
carries even more implications as it means that the country joins a club of major tradi-
tional donors. DAC membership requirements are fairly simple and straightforward. They 
include a) possessing a development cooperation strategy and institutional framework, b) 
demonstrating a measure of aid effort (providing at least US $100 million in ODA a year 
or 0.2% of the country’s GNI), and c) having a system for monitoring and evaluating the 
performance of development assistance (OECD, 2013a). Once countries have joined the 
DAC they are expected to progressively untie their aid, report their aid statistics regularly, 
attend DAC meetings, participate in peer reviews (as subjects as well as examiners) and 
endeavour to follow DAC recommendations – thus constantly improving their develop-
ment cooperation. 
Not all OECD countries were in a position to do this straight away. ‘Graduation’ to DAC 
membership was only possible for Ireland in 1985, Spain in 1991, Greece in 1999, and the 
Czech Republic and Iceland in 2013. For South Korea, joining the DAC in 2010 was a 
statement of a success of how a poverty-ridden, war-stricken country transformed itself 
over a couple of decades into a wealthy country able to give back the support it had re-
ceived from the rest of the world. Generally speaking, there are 9 OECD countries that are 
not part of the DAC, and recently they have been encouraged to use DAC concepts, stan-
dards and systems, undertake a lighter peer review, rationalise their development coopera-
tion, and endeavour to quantify and report their aid transparently. This trend has been 
particularly strong for countries like Turkey and the Eastern European member states that 
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67  Various comments uttered by government and civil society representatives in developing countries. 
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are part of the EU, which for geo-political reasons need to gradually engage and conform 
more with the DAC. Among the non-OECD countries that endeavour to follow DAC 
reporting systems are also Thailand and the United Arab Emirates. 
The Latin American middle-income countries which are part of the OECD, such as Mex-
ico, Chile and Colombia, do not have the same capabilities as industrialised countries to 
fully follow the DAC regulations and they also do not want to project themselves as donor 
countries yet, as they are still facing major poverty challenges domestically. Nevertheless 
Mexico is an ‘active observer’ of DAC meetings, trying to influence the aid effectiveness 
agenda, learning what it can from the experiences of traditional donors, and adapting what 
it can to the particular Mexican context (Bracho Carpizo / Garcia-López 2011). 
More serious apprehension in engaging with the DAC is felt by the BRICS countries, 
many of which constitute the pillars of the global South within the G77, historically seen 
as the anti-OECD movement. For most Southern partners, even the word ‘aid’ (the main 
business of the DAC) is a dirty word68. These middle-income countries do not want to 
project the image of being donors69 and still wish to continue receiving aid. They believe 
in the horizontal cooperation of equals rather than vertical, one-way provider-receiver 
relationships (Besharati 2012c). Their SSC does not fit into the traditional ODA definition 
and the DAC parameters (see previous discussion). They insist that their cooperation is 
different, and thus should not have the same responsibilities as that of industrialised coun-
tries or feel pressured to report according to the DAC norms (Bhatia 2013a/b). Overall, 
middle-income countries still consider themselves developing countries, economically and 
politically different from the OECD countries, which they view as still stuck in an anti-
quated paradigm of development70.
Outreach efforts 
The DAC has been aware of some of these concerns and since 2009 it has endeavoured to 
reach out to the emerging economies by becoming more flexible and open in its ap-
proaches for accommodating the engagement of middle-income countries in its work (At-
wood 2012; Bracho Carpizo / Garcia-López 2011). On 6 April 2011, the DAC issued a 
statement ‘welcoming new partners in international development cooperation’, acknowl-
edging diversity and the dual role of many countries as providers and receivers, opening 
dialogue to new partners without ‘preconditions’, and clarifying explicitly that countries 
can become members of the DAC while continuing to receive aid. Brian Atwood, then 
Chair of the DAC, travelled all the way to Beijing to provide a mandarin translation of this 
statement to the Chinese government and Communist Party. In these debates, Mexico has 
been very instrumental in persuading its OECD peers of the specificities of middle-income 
countries and the need to create a ‘comfort zone’ where new partners can engage (Bracho 
Carpizo / Garcia-López 2011; Atwood 2012). A year later, in December 2012, the DAC 
High Level Meeting in London released a communiqué, reaffirming the need to involve 
more actors in the development landscape who do not necessary follow DAC norms and 
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68  Comments from many African and South American officials involved in development cooperation. 
69  This has been repeated many times by representatives of countries such as South Africa, China, Brazil 
and Mexico, for instance. 
70  Comments made by several Brazilian, Indian, South African and Mexican diplomats engaged in the aid 
effectiveness debates since Paris (2005) up to the current post-Busan discussions. Confirmed also in re-
cent interviews in Paris and Pretoria (June-August 2013). 
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rules. With this it acknowledged the need to look at policy coherence and development 
effectiveness and agreed to re-visit the definition of ODA in order to take into account 
different forms of development finance that benefit recipient countries. 
Since 2007, the OECD and the DAC have been assiduously courting Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia and South Africa, identified as key partners (the K5) in a process of ‘enhanced 
engagement’, to encourage outreach and the sharing of knowledge with these major global 
players as well. For most of these countries the doors of the OECD are wide open with a 
red carpet and high hopes for membership. These Southern powers, however, while being 
in most part technically ready, are hesitant to formally join the OECD and the DAC for all 
the political reasons discussed above. They do not want to be bound to the obligations of 
OECD members as they are keen to retain the freedom of space to make their own policy 
choices71. Nonetheless, Brazil, Indonesia, India, China and South Africa still see the bene-
fits of engaging closely with the OECD, learning and drawing from its vast experience, 
knowledge and resources72. While not being officially members of the organisation, the 
K5 countries have diplomats in Paris permanently assigned to the OECD. The K5 coun-
tries are each engaged in 10 to 35 bodies, treaties, projects and instruments of the OECD, 
including contributing substantial fees for participation in such mechanisms. Even in 
committees where they are not official members, they attend meetings as observers includ-
ing the DAC and many of the peer reviews73.
An interesting example of collaborative initiatives has been the China-DAC study group 
which was formed in 2009 to exchange knowledge and experiences in promoting growth 
and poverty alleviation in developing countries (Atwood 2012). South Africa has been 
engaged with the OECD in such a way that, apart from Foreign Affairs officials, it has 
recently even posted a National Treasury attaché to Paris to deal with the manifold OECD 
engagements74. While there could be political repercussions in becoming an official mem-
ber of the Paris-based organisation, South Africa and the other K5 countries have realised 
that they can still reap all the benefits of the work of the OECD without necessarily be-
coming part of the organisation75.
Politically scattered, emerging economies 
Overall, Southern partners see the value of engaging with the OECD as a space to gather 
good practices from other countries, seek high-end analytical and technical advice, learn 
what is useful from the Northern experience and adapt to their own country contexts. 
Many of the middle-income countries, such as Mexico, Chile, South Africa and Brazil, are 
of the opinion that participating in OECD and DAC meetings, even as observers, allows 
them the opportunity to engage in important decision-making processes, influence devel-
oped countries’ policy, shape the common benchmarks – and basically change the system 
from within76. But, at the same time, most K5 countries are also aware of the implications 
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71  From an interview with a diplomat of one of the K5 countries in Paris, July 2013. 
72  Feedback provided by representatives from Indonesia, Brazil, China, South Africa in interviews held in 
Paris in July 2013. 
73  Interview with an OECD-DCD official, Paris, July 2013. 
74  Interview with South African Treasury officials in Pretoria, August 2013. 
75  Interview with a South African diplomat in Paris, July 2013. 
76  Interview with Mexican and South Korean diplomats in Paris, July 2013. 
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of joining the OECD, which is more of a political challenge than a technical one77. G77 
ideologies still dominate the diplomatic corps of Southern nations heavily. The result is a 
scattered situation among middle-income countries, some sticking more to a historical 
North-South dichotomous view of the world and some blurring the lines and joining the 
ranks of the traditional development partners. In connection to Table 1, Figure 1 highlights 
the political orientation of some of the major Southern providers which hover between the 
G77, the G20, the OECD and the DAC. This also gives a rough indication of the orienta-
tion of emerging economies in the Busan Global Partnership discussed in more depth in 
the next section. K5 countries are highlighted in bold and BRICS countries have an aster-
isk.
Figure 1: Emerging economies in the current aid effectiveness debates 
Source: Author’s own design. 
8. Bringing South-South cooperation into the aid effectiveness agenda 
We have seen previously that SSC and North-South cooperation have different historical 
evolutions and were progressing on two fairly separate paths until the second half of the 
2000s, when middle-income countries started to have a more prominent role in the global 
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77  Feedback from several South African officials gathered in interviews held in Pretoria and in Paris be-
tween 2010 and 2013. 
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political economy. Many DAC donors now want the Southern providers to also comply 
with the same rules of engagement with developing countries. The German government, 
for example, has stated: 
“It is becoming increasingly apparent that our global development partners 
[emerging economies] are now also acting as ‘donors’ – makers and drivers of 
global development agendas… [They] do not always operate in accordance with 
the same development policy principles and procedures as DAC donors. Differ-
ent interpretations and degrees of respect for the principles of development co-
operation, such as good governance, are increasingly causing the recipient 
countries to feel that double standards are present within the donor commu-
nity”
78
The underlying question which is now arising is: Should emerging economies that are now 
also giving substantial support to other developing countries be included in the monitoring 
and peer-review systems of traditional development partners? If they are both donors and 
recipients at the same time, where do they fit in to the global accountability frameworks 
for development cooperation? 
The legacy of Paris 
For the last five decades up to the first High Level Forum in Rome in 2003, aid effective-
ness debates were a territory exclusive to the Northern donors, and Southern counties were 
passive recipients of decisions made in Paris. This began to change in 2005 when develop-
ing countries were invited to be part of the second High Level Forum and to participate in 
shaping this debate. At this event, the renowned document of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness was produced. It summarised decades of DAC norms and standards of good 
practice of development cooperation. Although the intention was to come up with a joint 
compact on development cooperation principles agreed by donors and recipients, develop-
ing countries were only involved last minute, with some Southern diplomats complaining 
they received the draft document only a day before the conference79. As an African offi-
cial narrated, ‘developing countries were invited to Paris to have coffee and cookies with 
the donors’80.
Nonetheless, the Paris Declaration – together with the subsequent Accra Agenda for Ac-
tion –became the new ‘bible of aid effectiveness’. It was built around 5 principles, 12 
indicators, and targets to be achieved by 2010. A rigorous monitoring process was set in 
place managed centrally by the OECD-DAC secretariat. While an outstanding 134 coun-
tries and 26 international organisations had endorsed the Paris Declaration, the mecha-
nisms were built on a dichotomous paradigm where there were commitments to be 
achieved by donor countries and commitments to be achieved by recipient countries (Bra-
cho Carpizo / Garcia-López 2011) with nothing to capture the nuances in-between. India, 
South Africa, China and Mexico signed the Declaration as aid recipients, while Brazil and 
Venezuela did not ratify the document (Bracho Carpizo / Garcia-López 2011). Brazil 
refused to conform to what it considered an obnoxious system based of antiquated vertical 
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78  BMZ Strategy Paper 6/2011, Strategy for Development Cooperation with Global Development Partners 
2011-2015, Bonn, p. 12. 
79  Interview with Mexican and Brazilian delegates involved in the Paris process, July-August 2013. 
80  From a speech given by an African official at an SAIIA event in Pretoria in December 2012. 
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aid relationships, conditionalities, and rating systems contrary to the core values of its 
SSC81.
To guide the aid effectiveness process, the OECD-DAC had established the Working 
Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-Eff), with an executive committee made up of representa-
tives of multi-laterals, donor countries and recipient countries, named respectively ‘devel-
opment partners’ and ‘partner countries’ to reflect the new paradigm shift. Some of the 
Southern countries deeply engaged, and at times taking even leadership on various WP-
Eff processes, included South Africa, Egypt, Colombia, Indonesia, Thailand, Mexico, 
Ghana and Turkey. Some of these same MICs have also been some of the prime partners 
of trilateral cooperation arrangements with the OECD donors. At the same time, G77 
representatives gathering at Nairobi at the High Level Conference on South-South Techni-
cal Cooperation would continue to express reluctance to engage in the aid effectiveness 
agenda (UNECA 2011), seen as an imposition of Northern rules on international devel-
opment relations. 
Accra and South-South working groups 
Although, in Paris, the particular role of middle-income countries in development coop-
eration was not taken into serious consideration, the third High Level Forum hosted in 
Africa in 2008 was the beginning of the marriage between SSC and the Aid Effectiveness 
processes. The famous paragraph 19 of the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) stipulated: 
“We welcome the role of new contributors and will improve the way all devel-
opment actors work together by taking the following actions:  
a) We encourage all development actors, including those engaged in South-South 
co-operation, to use the Paris Declaration principles as a point of reference in 
providing development co-operation.
b) We acknowledge the contributions made by all development actors, and in par-
ticular the role of middle-income countries as both providers and recipients of 
aid. We recognise the importance and particularities of SSC and acknowledge 
that we can learn from the experience of developing countries. We encourage 
further development of triangular co-operation.
c) South-South co-operation on development aims to observe the principle of non-
interference in internal affairs, equality among developing partners and respect 
for their independence, national sovereignty, cultural diversity and identity and 
local content. It plays an important role in international development co-
operation and is a valuable complement to North-South co-operation.” (Accra 
Agenda for Action, 2008, par. 19)
The AAA paved the way for a more visible engagement of developing countries in the 
global aid effectiveness debates (Bracho Carpizo / Garcia-López 2011; Atwood 2012). 
Shortly after Accra, Colombia put forward a proposal to the WP-Eff and in 2009, backed 
by Mexico and Spain, to establish the Task Team on SSC (TT-SSC). The TT-SSC, chaired 
by Colombia and Indonesia, had the triple function of 1) enriching the Aid Effectiveness 
(AE) agenda with practices from SSC; 2) adapting the AE principles to SSC; and 3) ensur-
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81  Interviews with Brazilian officials in Paris and Pretoria in July 2013. 
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ing synergies between SSC and NSC. One of the first enterprises of the TT-SSC was a 
large analytical undertaking in close collaboration with Southern academia to review more 
than 100 case studies of good SSC experiences (Task Team on South-South Cooperation 
2010). The analytical work was show-cased at the High Level Event on SSC and Capacity 
Development held in Bogota in March 2010 which gave the opportunity to discuss the 
contribution made by SSC, explore regional perspectives, and flag out the challenges of 
coordination and information management. 
Over the next years, the Task Team made concerted efforts to reach out to diverse devel-
opment fora, including the G20 and the UNDCF. In the lead up to the HLF4 in Busan, it 
facilitated various regional consultations and made sure SSC featured high on the agenda. 
In Busan, the Task Team evolved into what is now known as the Building Block on 
South-South and Triangular Cooperation, however the work has lost much of its momen-
tum. Despite the fact that the process was supported by several Northern partners led by 
the World Bank Institute, both the Task Team and the Building Block lacked some legiti-
macy as certain major Southern powers such as Brazil, India and China did not participate. 
The frantic effort of Busan 
Hosted by South Korea, the new ‘poster child of the OECD’, the 4th High Level Forum in 
2011 set out as its main objective to bring a now large spectrum of development actors 
together under the same roof (Besharati 2012a). OECD countries, emerging economies, 
low-income countries, international organisations, the private sector, parliamentarians and 
civil society, all renewed their joint commitments towards internationally agreed global 
development goals, while at the same time acknowledging the different roles they played 
in the process. The idea was to reach common ground and to find ways to harmonise all 
types of development cooperation under universally agreed norms, explore complemen-
tarities and provide a space for exchange and learning. This implied also bringing in SSC 
into the DAC-like approaches to monitoring, evaluation and peer review, but within a 
more legitimate, broad-based and inclusive platform. 
The most challenging and complex political engagement of the Busan High Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) was to bring into the system the major emerging econo-
mies, which until then had firmly kept themselves at armed length from the OECD-DAC 
processes. Some of the Southern ‘hard-liners’ such as Venezuela and Cuba were not even 
invited to the HLF-4, probably because of their links to North Korea82. In Busan getting 
China to join the club became the new obsession of the DAC countries83. Having said that, 
all major Southern partners had major concerns with the political and technical implica-
tions of being put on the same-level plane as traditional donors. While Brazil finally 
agreed to come to the table, China signalled before the conference that it would not en-
dorse the Busan Agreement, which gave further support to also India’s position. After 
protracted negotiations leading up to and into the late hours of the Busan HLF-4 – and 
through some very serious British and South Korean diplomatic efforts (Atwood 2012) – 
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82  Informal discussion with a Southern diplomat, August 2013. 
83  Comments made by an official from a multilateral organisation closely involved in the negotiation of the 
Busan Outcome Document, July 2013. 
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India and China finally agreed to sign the Busan Global Partnership document84 with the 
last minute additional paragraph which they proposed adding to the first page stating that: 
 “The nature, modalities and responsibilities that apply to South-South co-
operation differ from those that apply to North-South co-operation. At the same 
time, we recognize that we are all part of a development agenda in which we 
participate on the basis of common goals and shared principles. In this context, 
we encourage increased efforts to support effective co-operation based on our 
specific country situations. The principles, commitments and actions agreed in 
the outcome document of Busan shall be the reference for South-South partners 
on a voluntary basis.” (Busan HLF-4 Outcome Document 2011, par. 2)
This stems from the belief that SSC and NSC are essentially different in their approach, 
features and historical functions. This political stance, coupled with many technical limita-
tions (already discussed in this paper), made Southern providers assert that it would not be 
fair to assess their development cooperation with the same standards and criteria set for 
the traditional donors. In the Busan negotiations, the Rio Declaration (1992) discourse 
around ‘common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)’ re-emerged during the de-
bate. In order not to replicate the exact same language of the climate change talks (Atwood 
2012), Busan sherpas agreed to use the terms of ‘differential commitments’85. Busan ac-
knowledged the important role emerging economies play in global development, high-
lighting their specificities and acknowledging their dual role as South-South providers and
aid-receivers. The underlying rationale behind the concept of ‘differential commitments’ 
was captured in the paragraph proposed by Mexico and backed up by Brazil which 
stressed that: 
“Today’s complex architecture for development co-operation has evolved from 
the North-South paradigm. Distinct from the traditional relationship between aid 
providers and recipients, developing nations and a number of emerging econo-
mies have become important providers of South-South development co-
operation. They remain developing countries and still face poverty at home. As 
such, they remain eligible to benefit from development co-operation provided by 
others, yet they have increasingly taken upon themselves the responsibility to 
share experiences and co-operate with other developing countries. The Paris 
Declaration did not address the complexity of these new actors, while the Accra 
Agenda for Action recognized their importance and specificities. While North-
South co-operation remains the main form of development co-operation, South-
South co-operation continues to evolve, providing additional diversity of re-
sources for development. At Busan, we now all form an integral part of a new 
and more inclusive development agenda, in which these actors participate on the 
basis of common goals, shared principles and differential commitments.” (Busan 
Outcome Document, par. 14) 

84  Based on accounts of various diplomats and officials closely involved in the Busan negotiations; various 
interviews held between 2011-2013. 
85  Based on accounts of various diplomats and officials closely involved in the Busan negotiations, July-
August 2011, interviews held in Paris and Mexico City. 
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All in all, the final Busan Outcome Document was a much diluted and weaker text than 
the Paris and Accra commitments (Besharati 2012a)86. The Australians, Canadians, the 
Americans and civil society delegations were not happy with the Chinese/Indian additions 
(Atwood 2012) but compromises needed to be finally made in order to accommodate the 
new actors. The platform has been very cleverly called the ‘Global Partnership’ to link it 
back to the initial MDG8 process. The word ‘aid’ had almost disappeared from the dis-
course (it had been replaced by ‘development cooperation’) and traditional dichotomies 
between NSC and SSC had been blurred. The new Busan Global Partnership transformed 
the ‘aid effectiveness’ agenda into a broader ‘development effectiveness’ agenda, which 
looks at diverse sources of development financing, policy coherence and a range of issues 
advocated by the North, the South and non-State actors. 
Southern providers in post-Busan
A more detailed analysis of the overall developments post-Busan can be found in my 
previous paper (Besharati, 2013a). Because of that this section will focus only on the en-
gagement of the Southern providers in the post-Busan debates. Throughout all these dis-
cussions, emerging economies who are members of the OECD, such as South Korea and 
Mexico, have tried to play a mediating role between the traditional donors and the South, 
which they still feel strongly a part of. Korea organised the HLF-4 and Mexico is now 
planning to host the 1st post-Busan ministerial meeting in April 2014 which will build on 
their solid international diplomacy experience gained from the Los Cabos G20 Summit 
(2012), the Cancun Climate Change talks (2010) and the Monterrey Conference on Fi-
nancing for Development (2002). 
Interestingly, the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation is the only 
OECD-sponsored mechanism which (at least on paper) is endorsed by all 5 key partners 
(Brazil, India, China Indonesia and South Africa). But one of the weaknesses of the out-
come document was that it left a lot of important details (time-lines, targets, indicators, 
and the monitoring framework) to be decided and operationalised in the post-Busan dis-
cussions. Shortly after Busan, an interim group (PBIG) was set up to assist the old Work-
ing Party on Aid Effectiveness to transform itself into the new Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) steering committee that would follow up 
on the Busan commitments. India and China followed this delicate transition process as 
silent but attentive observers, while South Africa, Mexico and Brazil were more active and 
vocal in the post-Busan discussions87. After an initial few meetings, however the major 
BRICS economies gradually lost interest in the process and went back to their default 
positions. 
Shortly after the HLF-4, Argentina wrote a formal letter to the OECD secretariat express-
ing its non-endorsement of the Busan Partnership88. In the subsequent Spring 2012 meet-
ings of the UN in New York, several of the Latin American and G77 countries debated if 
they should withdraw their endorsement and avoid future references to the Busan process, 

86  See also the views of commentators such as Maxwell (2012) and Owen (2011). 
87  Based on accounts from OECD officials and Southern diplomats engaged in the post-Busan talks. 
88  Account given by one of the diplomats heavily involved in the Busan and GPEDC processes, August 
2013. 
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which they did not view as legitimate and implemented within the correct UN apparatus, 
but rather as an agenda driven by the rich countries (Atwood 2012).89
As a result of long-standing and recent history, many of the Southern powers still view the 
Busan Global Partnership with caution and suspicion, concerned that this might be a ‘trap’ 
through which DAC commitments and standards are imposed on them and they are pres-
sured into a monitoring and accountability system with rules they do not agree with90.
Brasilia has historical grudges against the aid effectiveness process which go back to Paris 
HLF-2 (see the section entitled "The legacy of Paris") while Beijing has serious technical, 
conceptual and political problems in applying DAC norms to its particular approach to 
cooperation (see for instance Xiaoyun / Guoliang 2009; Hackenesch 2009) and Delhi is 
still strongly engrained in an ideological North-South divide, which stems from antagonist 
G77 views towards the Busan Global Partnership and the concern that the UN would be 
the more appropriate and legitimate forum to discuss development cooperation issues 
(Bhatia 2013b; Nairobi Outcome Document 2009)91. All three countries have made it very 
clear that they do not want to be ‘monitored’ or ‘rated’ with indicators and criteria made 
by and for Northern development partners (Bhatia 2013; Atwood 2012) 
Among the BRICS peers, South Africa stands out as different because its foreign policy is 
very closely tied to the position of the rest of the continent. Though not agreeing to many 
DAC approaches, Africa all-in-all appreciated and pro-actively utilised the WP-Eff plat-
form (Atwood 2012; Besharati 2013a) and now the Global Partnership, as a space to voice 
its concerns and as a mechanism to keep all development partners accountable in their 
development cooperation commitments with the continent. As such, South Africa contin-
ues to engage in the GPEDC processes though, like its other peer Colombia, it has tempo-
rarily stepped back from the global debates to sort out the internal restructuring of its de-
velopment cooperation strategy (Besharati 2013a). Nonetheless, South Africa and Mexico 
played an active role in facilitating the nomination of Indonesia as co-chair of the GPEDC 
steering committee (Atwood 2012). 
On the steering committee of the Global Partnership, Indonesia and Peru represent the so-
called ‘provider-recipient countries’. But despite this, there is virtually no proper channel 
of consultation, coordination, information-sharing, and position-building between the 
constituency of middle-income countries and their representatives who sit on the GPEDC 
steering committee. This problem of communication between GPEDC steering committee 
members and their constituency does not only relate to middle-income countries but also 
to Africa, the private sector and ironically even the DAC countries, many of which have 
complained that they are not receiving enough information on progress with the Global 
Partnership92 . This calls for an urgent re-visiting of the assumptions upon which the 
GPEDC was built, particularly to check whether capacities are truly in place to allow for 
the envisioned constituency-based mechanisms to work93.
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89  The same story was accounted by a UNDP New York official at a meeting in Pretoria in February 2013. 
90  Comments made by many Southern academics and policy-makers from discussions held in Shanghai, 
Delhi, Addis, Duisburg and Paris during the course of 2013. 
91  Based also on an interview with a South African official explaining the role of their BRICS peers in the 
Busan process, July 2013. 
92  Based on interviews with OECD officials and diplomats from DAC and non-DAC countries, June-July 
2013. 
93  See discussion in my previous paper Besharati (2013a), and Atwood (2012). 
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On paper, developing countries are more numerous than donor countries so, in theory, the 
South should have a greater bargaining power in the Global Partnership. In practice, 
though, recipient countries have far less resources at their disposal and thus less capacity 
to engage in the debates than industrialised countries do. The system is thus still very 
DAC-dominated, using definitions, categories, tools, methods and measurements estab-
lished by the traditional donors. Just as it has been in the past for the aid effectiveness 
process, the bulk of the funding for the GPEDC activities comes from DAC donors, which 
even end up subsidising the travels of Southern representatives to come to international 
meetings. Although the GPEDC was designed to be independent from the OECD-DAC, 
the secretariat of the Global Partnership still operates from within the OECD Development 
Cooperation Directorate. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) who in 
Busan was also invited to provide technical support to the system and to assist in the out-
reach and support to developing countries, does not have the same level of experience as 
the OECD and is not able to mobilise the required funding to support its GPEDC secretar-
ial role. This might also indicate the low level of interest of middle-income countries in 
supporting the GPEDC process. As a result, most of the substantive work is still directed 
from Paris which adds strength to the conclusion from the South that “the Busan Global 
Partnership is the same old DAC-run show”94.
9. Applying traditional norms to emerging donors 
An impossible union? 
The political processes described in the previous sections have provided vivid examples of 
the enormous tensions which exist in trying to integrate the emerging economies into the 
traditional development cooperation architecture. There are some political forces (mostly 
Northern) that push for ‘universality’95 in development cooperation norms that expect 
NSC and SSC to follow the same rules of engagement and be evaluated under the same 
framework. Other views (mostly Southern) strongly advocate the ‘specificity’ of each type 
of cooperation and tend to highlight the incompatibility of NSC and SSC that originates 
from different histories, follow different inspirations, paradigms and premises, and operate 
under different models, approaches and delivery mechanisms (Bhatia 2013). Development 
cooperation from middle-income countries is therefore a completely different beast, and 
some have even gone to the extreme to argue that SSC should not even be considered 
ODA (Nairobi Outcome Document, 2009). 
Representatives of Southern providers are thus very emphatic in underlining that they 
should not be expected to carry the same responsibilities and obligations as traditional 
donors.96 The understanding is that their small cooperation with other fellow developing 
countries is done on a ‘voluntary basis’, in the spirit of ‘solidarity’ and free from the con-

94  Almost the exact words were taken from an interview with a Southern diplomat in Paris in July 2013. 
Similar comments were made by Southern academics gathered at a conference in Shanghai in January 
2013. 
95  Highlighted by Elizabeth Sidiropoulos at the workshop on ‘Development Agencies in Emerging Pow-
ers’ held in Mexico City, August 2013. 
96  Views gathered through interviews with numerous officials from various BRICS and other middle-
income countries in Pretoria and Paris between 2012 and 2013. 
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straints and pressures of externally imposed rules and accountability mechanisms set by 
the North (Bhatia 2013). The old promises of traditional donors do not apply to them, 
hence the argument of ‘differential commitments’ (see discussion above on Busan). As 
many of the targets of the traditional donors are still unfulfilled, this puts the spotlight on 
the emerging economies but this is also seen as a way to distract attention from the his-
torical commitments of the developed countries which are still outstanding97. These are 
some of the many Southern political stances that have animated the debate. However, 
there are also some clear technical problems to be addressed. Traditional donors have been 
engaged in development cooperation for almost fifty years and have had time to develop 
experience and a mature complexity in their systems. Middle-income countries, on the 
other hand, are still fairly new to this field and are still learning and developing their infant 
development agencies. Thus capacities are very different: it would be just as inappropriate 
to ask an elementary school student to follow the same rules as a university student98.
African governments acknowledge the emergence of new ‘Asian’ donors on the continent, 
and appreciate the options they now have of engaging in a variety of development partner-
ships both with old and new players. Although they acknowledging the pros and the cons 
of these diverse ‘cooperation packages’, recipient countries nevertheless do feel that the 
basic rules of engagement still apply to all development partners.99 The following section 
will explore some of these specific development cooperation principles and discuss 
whether they should, or should not apply to Southern providers. 
Some common grounds 
Politics aside, not all traditional aid effectiveness principles are necessarily bad. They 
exist for a reason100. They are based on decades of experience in North-South cooperation 
and on what evidence has been shown to work in favour of recipient countries. Hence 
Busan and previous HLFs remain a useful framework from which all partners (emerging 
economies included) can pick and choose what is useful for their purposes. Most of the 
commitments and principles agreed in Paris, Accra and Busan were in fact requested by 
the developing world (including the Southern providers when they were recipients of aid). 
Why, then, should they disagree with the same principles when it comes to their outgoing 
development cooperation? 
Often the same principles and values for development cooperation contained in documents 
from the OECD-DAC community are the same as those also contained in SSC documents 
produced in Bandung (1955), Buenos Aires (1978), Nairobi (2009), Bogota (2010) and 
other major Southern conferences. NSC and SSC converge for example in beliefs such as 
national ownership and that development assistance should be aligned to the priorities of 
recipient countries; in the idea of inclusiveness and multi-stakeholder participation; the 
importance of capacity development; and in the principle of transparency and mutual 
accountability (see Ling 2010; Hackenesch 2009; Chaturvedi / Fues / Sidiropoulos 2012; 
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97  From interviews with representatives of BRICS countries in Paris and Pretoria from June-July 2013. 
98  This analogy was made by an academic and expert in Chinese development cooperation in an interview 
in Duisburg in June 2013. 
99  Based on interviews with various representatives of low-income recipient countries in Africa, July-
September 2013. 
100  Comments of a UK DFID official during an interview in Pretoria, June 2013. 
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Tortora / OECD-DCD 2011 for more in-depth comparative analysis). North-South and 
South-South experiences have also frequently come together in successful ‘triangular co-
operations’ where many middle-income countries, such as Chile, Mexico, South Africa, 
Brazil and Colombia, have played a ‘pivotal’ role by partnering with traditional donors in 
the provision of assistance to other third developing countries. 
Transparency, accountability and results 
Transparency in development cooperation is of important value to all partners: tax-payers, 
beneficiaries, civil society, parliaments, academia and the general public, whether in the 
North or in the South, all have the right to know how their governments and agencies 
manage their development finance. In previous sections we have already discussed the 
weaknesses of the information management systems of the emerging donors, and the im-
plications this has on transparency, accountability and reporting. 
The shortfalls in upholding this principle is therefore often not the result of a deliberate 
political decision but simply of a lack of technical capacities and resources in Southern 
providers to undertake the thorough reporting exercises on a regular basis and at the stan-
dards currently expected by the seasoned development agencies. For the majority of 
emerging donors, the real challenge is to get an accurate overview from the manifold 
agencies in their country engaged in different development cooperation activities interna-
tionally (Besharati 2013b; De Mello e Souza 2013; Huang 2013). In most middle-income 
countries, the general population is also more concerned with accountability and corrup-
tion vis-à-vis domestic public spending and less with that related to the relatively small 
foreign aid provided in cooperation with other countries. 
The Chinese case is, however, an exception where the entire political system is not as 
interested in democratic accountability and the detailed information sharing on govern-
ment finance. The exact figures of Chinese aid to specific partner countries is a ‘state 
guarded secret’ (Grimm et al. 2009; Afrodad, 2008), that not even beneficiaries or Chinese 
academics are able to access101 due to the sensitivities surrounding the publicising of such 
figures and the concerns of repercussions this might have on local constituents (as dis-
cussed in previous sections). The situation has improved slightly however with the recent 
public release in 2011 by the Chinese government of its White Paper on foreign aid which 
summarises 60 years of Chinese assistance to the developing world and attempts to re-
verse some of the negative publicity that Chinese cooperation has been getting interna-
tionally (see early sections). 
While, in their international development assistance, Northern donors and their citizens 
are increasingly giving attention to ‘value for money’ and ‘results’, the drivers of SSC are 
often of more political and diplomatic nature and are thus less concerned with the actual 
development impact. In NSC, the results-based orientation encourages a more serious 
utilisation of monitoring and evaluation systems, while in the Southern model, the costs of 
undertaking rigorous and complex evaluations might not be justified in relationship to the 
small amounts of resources which are being spent on conducting SSC. Rigorous M&E and 
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101  Based on feedback provided by Afrodad researchers and academics and experts of Chinese coopera-
tion in private discussions held in Shanghai, Delhi, Duisburg and Johannesburg during the course of 
2012/13. 
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reporting systems utilised by Northern donors can thus become too burdensome for some 
Southern providers. 
The 0.7% target 
One of the most contentious debates is that concerning the commitment of developed 
countries to provide 0.7% of the donor country’s GNI to development assistance. The 
origin of such a target goes back to the 1960s/70s. The initial proposal, which came from 
the World Council of Churches, was further refined by Tinbergen and by the Pearson 
Commission until it was officially endorsed by the UN General Assembly as a parameter 
of what was expected from rich countries to help the poor in the world. 
Although in general there is no real push for middle-income countries to adopt such stan-
dards, some analysts have suggested that emerging donors could have a similar target such 
as 0.2% (Grimm 2011; European Report on Development 2013). Most Southern policy-
makers and academics have rebutted that this was a standard set by the North for the 
North and should not apply to development cooperation from the South102. Emerging 
donors, in fact, do not have the same historical baggage as the developed countries, but 
rather provide the little they have on a voluntary basis in a spirit of solidarity, friendship, 
ubuntu (DIRCO 2011), and neighbourly support. Because of this, it would be inappropri-
ate for Southern countries to be pressured into quantitative targets for external assistance 
when they still have so much poverty and socio-economic challenges at home to address. 
And, finally, it would be out of place for traditional donors to expect a similar effort from 
new partners, when only a few European countries (such as the Nordic countries, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) have managed to fulfil the 0.7% target in 
decades of development cooperation. Interestingly, some of the middle-income countries 
such as South Africa have already surpassed this amount and are providing near to 1% of 
their GDP in development cooperation activities (Grimm 2011; Vickers 2012). 
Tied aid 
One aspect closely linked to the fair measurement of volumes of assistance to the develop-
ing world is the issue of ‘tied aid’. It can happen that a donor country reports that it is 
providing a lot of money to a developing country although very little might actually go 
into the hands of the government and people of the recipient country. This is because 
development cooperation is provided in conjunction with contractors (NGOs, companies, 
technical specialists), overpriced services and products and goods from the donor country. 
This is clearly ‘counter-developmental’ as it leads neither to national ownership, capacity-
building nor to the use of local expertise, materials and resources. Although it is accepted 
that both parties can theoretically gain from development cooperation, in principle most of 
the benefits of the partnership should go to the poorer country. 
Tied-aid practices have been longed the subject of criticism from civil society and devel-
oping countries (Jepma 1991) and this is why DAC donors have been endeavouring to 
gradually ‘untie’ their aid for decades. The new donors for their part are starting to grapple 
with the same challenges as the traditional donors, especially as much of the South-South 
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102  Based on interviews held with Indian, Chinese, Brazilian and South African academics and govern-
ment officials between 2012 and 2013. 
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support is provided through technical cooperation which is extremely prone to being pro-
vided via home country institutions and human resources. What is highly criticised, for 
example, is Chinese development assistance (especially financial assistance) to Africa 
which is almost entirely provided with Chinese contractors, technology and personnel, 
giving little room for the development of local capacities and the support of the recipient 
country’s industries. 
Tied aid undertaken by emerging economies is however to some extent more justifiable 
than that from industrialised countries. As discussed earlier, emerging economies are still 
nations that are developing and therefore also need to take care of the development of their 
own economies and local industries and to assist their experts, companies and banks to 
expand their presence in the global markets. The same trend was visible in industrialised 
countries at the early stages of their development cooperation. Prior to the 1990s, aid from 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany was very tied, and even now 
smaller DAC donors such as Spain, Greece and Italy continue to provide assistance linked 
to their local NGOs and country personnel. This has often been justified on the ground of 
having to win the support of local constituencies and electorates in order to release more 
Parliamentary (or Congress) funding for foreign aid. 
At the same time, while claiming to have untied their aid, many traditional donors require 
in their procurement policies service providers who are able to comply with tight regula-
tions, speak the home language and be officially accredited in the donor country’s data-
bases, thus making it almost impossible for contractors from third countries to apply for 
such tenders (Besharati 2011)103. From this perspective, Chinese academics are currently 
discussing with their government (Huang 2013) that, even if China were to untie its devel-
opment cooperation, Chinese products and its workforce would still be competitive in the 
global development industry due to low costs, high productivity and quick and efficient 
implementation periods. In principle, South Africa and Brazil disapprove of the practice of 
tied aid and officially provide cooperation that is untied; nonetheless de-facto assistance is 
almost always connected to the institutions, technology and experts of the provider coun-
tries, similar to the approach undertaken by traditional donors. The DAC countries’ 
agreement in 2001 to untie their aid excludes scholarships, food aid and technical assis-
tance (Atwood 2012) which ironically constitutes the overwhelming majority of the assis-
tance that Africa still receives from most of its donors (Collier 2008; Besharati 2011). 
Coordination and monitoring – a country-led thing! 
Coordination and harmonisation have been principles of aid effectiveness discussed by the 
DAC community since the first HLF in 2003. The rationale of donor coordination is to 
avoid duplication, promote coherence, reduce fragmentation and facilitate division of 
labour. While the purpose is to reduce transaction costs to recipient countries, sometimes 
coordination can also be costly and time-consuming and might not be worth the invest-
ment. For this reason, DAC donors sometimes decide to coordinate their aid activities 
because it allows them to have a united approach when exerting policy conditionalities on 
recipient countries. In recent years, however, coordination and harmonisation have been 
generally in decline due also to increased donor concerns with visibility (Vollmer 2012). 
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103  See also http://www.bond.org.uk/data/files/publications/Country_Ownership.pdf. 
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For the reasons discussed above, emerging donors operating in developing countries are 
often reticent to coordinate their efforts with those of the traditional donors. This has 
sometimes led to emerging donors operating in diametrically opposed ways to the tradi-
tional development partners – both positively and negatively (see early discussions). As 
emerging donors do not follow the norms established by the community of traditional 
partners, their activities in Africa are often criticised for not following the correct envi-
ronmental norms, safety standards, labour regulations, and quality of service delivery 
(Naim 2007; Grimm 2011; Afrodad 2008). Although many universal principles have been 
set in the UN, WTO, World Bank, ILO and other international conventions, much of the 
implementation of such standards are subject to the legal and regulatory frameworks of the 
partner countries. 
The other side of the story is that the emergence of new donors in Africa is a positive 
thing, as it provides partner countries with access to different choices, options and devel-
opment packages. This also gives the recipient country more bargaining power as it lever-
ages the strength of each development partner in order to maximise returns on its local 
development. 
For effective coordination of development cooperation activities to occur, recipient coun-
tries must be in the driving seat and ensure that all the support they receive is aligned and 
contributing to their national development priorities. They must set the rules of the game 
and the standards to be followed in the country – and enforce them on every development 
partner, whether North, South, public or private. Strong ownership and leadership is re-
quired by recipient countries in establishing appropriate forums and frameworks which 
bring together both traditional donors and new donors under ‘shared principles and differ-
ential commitments’, but nevertheless based on partner-country development planning, 
budgeting and monitoring and evaluation systems. National level accountability frame-
works can be extremely powerful and effective – hence the rationale for the Busan call for 
‘global light and country-focused’ monitoring of development cooperation. 
Country-level accountability works when there are sufficient capacities in the recipient 
country to manage the diverse development partners working with them. However it is 
easier to build national monitoring systems and exert pressure on partners if there is a 
global framework universally agreed in multilateral fora which partner countries can con-
tinually refer back to in their engagements with their donors. Hence the usefulness of 
global and regional standard-setting, monitoring and peer review fora, discussed in earlier 
sections of the paper. 
10. A framework for South-South cooperation: the time has come! 
The bold step of Delhi 
The issues, tensions and peculiarities of South-South cooperation in relationship to the 
North-South aid system had been discussed as far back as the Bandung (1955) and Buenos 
Aires (1972) conferences and have been on the agenda of the United Nations institutions 
(namely UNCTAD, UNDESA, UNDP) for decades. However the movement has picked 
up a great deal of momentum in recent years through conferences such as Nairobi (2009), 
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Bogota (2010) and the UNDCF processes. 2013 has likewise been a year filled with de-
bates around the emerging economies in the global development agenda with thought-
provoking discussions held at Addis Ababa, Shanghai, Beijing, Pretoria, Durban, Johan-
nesburg and Mexico City, to name a few meetings, often organised with the support of 
Northern partners. 
But one outstanding gesture of leadership coming from the South was the April 2013 
Delhi Conference on Southern Providers, entirely funded by the government of India. This 
included academics, officials and representative from all major SSC partners around the 
world, and participation by high-level political figures such as UN Under-Secretary-
General Wu Hongbo and Indian Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai. The Delhi Conference 
called for the intensification of dialogue and collaboration among Southern academics and 
policy-makers to encourage better evidence-based analysis, systematic collection of data 
and evaluation of SSC. It emphasised the need to share experiences, promote peer learn-
ing, the exchange of knowledge and thus the institution-building of the new emerging 
development agencies. It underlined the need to strengthen regional and multilateral sys-
tems in order to provide Southern partners with more platforms on which to engage with 
one another on issues of common concern in order to help them build common positions 
and take up more proactive roles in the larger global fora where developed countries also 
participate, including the Busan Global Partnership (see more in RIS/UNDESA/MEA 
report, 2013). Some of the ideas discussed in Delhi, as well as at other recent meetings of 
the South, will be elaborated on further in the next few sections, outlining a number of 
potential proposals on how to advance the agenda further in the upcoming years. 
Improve evidence for learning, effectiveness and accountability 
Nobody questions the constructive role that South-South cooperation can play in interna-
tional development, but notwithstanding the stacks of literature on the subject and the 
decades of debates, real evidence of the impact of SSC on the ground is still extremely 
thin. As a result, discussions are dominated by the rhetoric of both critics and supporters 
of the new donors in the global development landscape. We have seen in earlier sections 
of this paper that major knowledge gap still exist when it comes to precise volumes, im-
pact, effectiveness and the quality of the development cooperation from emerging devel-
opment partners. For all intents and purposes, strengthening the evidence of SSC coopera-
tion is now a high imperative. 
The development cooperation packages from Southern partners are gradually increasing 
(UN-ECOSOC, 2008-2009, UNDESA, 2010-2013), and thus also the influence of middle-
income countries on the rest of the developing world. If emerging economies want to be 
taken seriously on the global scene, they need to be more organised and systematic with 
regard to their development cooperation. Many middle-income countries are at embryonic 
stages in the establishment of their international development agencies (Chaturvedi / Fues 
/ Sidiropoulos 2012), hence it is important that they ‘get it right’ and learn from their own 
past experiences, that of their peers, as well as the experiences of traditional development 
partners, whether positive or negative. Evaluation is thus key to ongoing learning, refine-
ment and improvement. 
Effectiveness’, a word often associated with the OECD-DAC processes, is actually a neu-
tral concept that can also be applied to SSC. It is about making sure that objectives are 
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met, and that desired results are accomplished successfully. The results and objectives of 
traditional donors or emerging economies might be different from one another, however 
both want to make sure that their aims are achieved. Thus the evaluation of the effective-
ness of a cooperation programme of any development agency is a necessary exercise. This 
is usually done within the framework of the country’s foreign policy objectives, whether 
these are developmental, commercial, or strategic. 
Related to effectiveness is also the concept of accountability, where both Northern and 
Southern donors need to justify to their citizens, their parliaments and their domestic con-
stituents the ‘investments’ that are being made overseas. Accountability towards the bene-
ficiaries or partner countries of the cooperation programme is also critical. Some recipient 
countries, particularly in Africa, have reported to have experienced similar issues with 
Southern providers to the ones they have experienced in the past with Northern donors104.
Thus building strong monitoring and evaluation systems and institutional capacities to 
provide ongoing evidence for the design and improvement of future cooperation pro-
grammes with the rest of the developing world is a priority for all emerging development 
partners.
A frame of reference for SSC 
Having established the need and importance of monitoring, evaluation, evidence and ac-
countability, there needs to be clear parameters by which these analytical exercises are 
conducted. Without clear definitions and reporting guidelines we cannot come to grips 
with the exact volumes of Southern flows, and without standards and norms we cannot 
empirically evaluate the quality and contribution made by emerging economies to interna-
tional development. By what criteria are we supposed to judge the impact and effective-
ness of SSC? 
We have seen earlier in this paper that the OECD-DAC has spent over 50 years defining, 
guiding and creating standards for ‘effective’ development cooperation. For political and 
technical reasons, also discussed earlier, we have also seen that emerging donors experi-
ence major discomfort (to say the least) in following the ‘Paris aid effectiveness systems’ 
as their modus operandi. Southern actors in development cooperation do not believe it is 
appropriate to assess their international development activities using the rules, standards 
and principles of NSC because this emerged from a different historical path, conceptual 
paradigms and delivery approaches. They do not want to subject themselves to the peer 
review, accountability and norms of a system which they did not take part in devising. It 
would thus not be appropriate to judge development cooperation from Southern providers 
with the same criteria and standards set by the traditional donors. 
Although these concerns are all valid, it is not good enough to just refute anything coming 
from the DAC, without having an alternative proposal to put on the table. Middle-income 
countries need to develop for themselves a framework that they are comfortable with in 
the evaluation of their development cooperation activities. To build such a framework, one 
could begin by distilling the principles discussed at historical South conferences such as 

104  At an Oxfam/NEPAD/Afrodad side-event during the BRICS Summit in March 2013 in Durban, repre-
sentatives from African countries mentioned challenges with regard to transparency and tied-aid prac-
tices which they had been experiencing with some of the development assistance from BRICS coun-
tries.
Common goals and differential commitments: The role of emerging economies in global development 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 47
Bandung, Buenos Aires, Nairobi, G77, ASA (Africa South America (Forum)), AU, etc. In 
order for it to be effective, it would require a technically sound monitoring system with 
clear indicators and empirical measurement systems. The methodological details on how 
to measure the quality of SSC could be elaborated by the rich pool of technical experts 
and academics already present in developing countries. 
What are the ‘differential commitments’? 
Once a framework for defining, measuring and assessing SSC is in place, the next big and 
sensitive question would then be: Are emerging economies ready to make promises, 
commitments and assign targets to their development cooperation efforts? This speaks to 
the concept of ‘responsibilities’ that is a highly politically loaded word. On the one hand, 
the traditional donors are quite keen to share the burden of their international development 
obligation with the new emerging economies which have gathered much momentum in the 
recent decade in the light of slow growth (or even recession) in industrialised countries. 
On the other side, middle-income countries continue to insist that they are still developing 
countries with lots of poverty, inequality and domestic issues to address before worrying 
about global public goods. They argue that SSC should be free from any form of ‘obliga-
tion’ (Bhatia 2013) and on the contrary should be implemented on a voluntary basis and in 
the spirit of solidarity. As middle-income countries still have fairly limited capacities, it 
would be unfair to expect the same level of duties from them as from seasoned donors. 
Although there can be a certain degree of tolerance and flexibility when applying rules to 
the new partners, at some point it will still be important to define exactly what the ‘differ-
ential commitments’ are that are expected from middle-income countries in international 
development. Following Busan, Mexico has been urging its Southern peers to demonstrate 
leadership in unpacking the concept of ‘differential commitments’ by outlining clearly the 
role of middle-income countries in international development, so that traditional donors no 
longer have an excuse to slide back on their own unfulfilled responsibilities105. African 
recipients are also increasingly demanding more transparency and accountability in their 
cooperation activities from all development partners, both traditional and emerging106.
11. Finding a ‘home’ for South-South cooperation  
The last few sections have summarised some of the major debates currently taking place 
and have highlighted the pressing need to establish a forum where emerging donors can 
define, measure, regularly analyse, monitor and account for their development coopera-
tion. An information hub dedicated to the collection, coordination, compilation, process-
ing and dissemination of development cooperation data from middle-income countries is 
needed (UN-ECOSOC 2009). Moreover, a framework needs to be created with criteria, 
standards, principles and norms to guide effective cooperation among the nations of the 
South. Having such a system in place would then encourage peer review, accountability, 
exchange and the distilling of good practices among Southern providers: in short, an entire 

105  Remarks made by Geraldo Bracho Carpizo (Mexican diplomat engaged in the GPEDC) at the work-
shop on ‘Development Agencies of Emerging Powers’ held in Mexico City, August 2013. 
106  Based on remarks made by government and civil society representatives from Rwanda, Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique and South Africa (March-September 2013). 
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system similar to the DAC is also required for the South107. The bottom line is that one or 
more platforms (Bhatia, 2013) need to be established where Southern partners can jointly 
define, monitor and evaluate their development cooperation, encouraging learning and 
further development of South-South development partnerships. 
Such a process will require political support and the engagement by the highest govern-
ment quarters within the Southern providers. In previous sections we have seen how for 
decades traditional donors have utilised the OECD-DAC as the main forum to systemati-
cally gather aid data, monitor trends, set standards, evaluate effectiveness, review and 
learn from one another on how to improve their development assistance programmes. 
Notwithstanding the effort of the DAC to open up to emerging partners, the earlier work 
around the TT-SSC, and finally the Busan effort to create a new more inclusive platform, 
most of the big emerging economies are still reluctant to engage as they see the process as 
still very DAC-driven, following a Northern paradigm which they do not agree with. 
Different narratives, different approaches and now ‘differential commitments’ probably 
also require a ‘different house’. This implies both a new institutional home as well as a 
new physical location where discussions are conducted. There is still too much historical 
legacy linking the GPEDC to the OECD aid effectiveness apparatus and this turns major 
Southern partners off. For a development cooperation discourse to assume more legiti-
macy and inclusivity, the policy-making and operational centre needs to shift away from 
Paris and move towards a country in the South (ideally in Africa). 
Critical in all of this is the issue of who is going to fund such a platform and the entire 
system that comes with it? In the past many similar attempts have been initiated, sup-
ported and financed by Northern donors, but this has also made them lose legitimacy. For 
the process to retain credibility it is important that the financial and human resources for 
establishing and maintaining such a platform also come from the South. The financing of 
such a multilateral system needs to be commensurate and proportional to the economic 
capacities of the participating countries. At the same time, resources in the developing 
world are very limited and, although some of the big middle-income countries could po-
tentially afford the bill, there also needs to be enough political will to invest in creating 
such new structures. 
The issue is indeed very complex. Initial thought must naturally be given to utilising the 
current structures existing globally and possibly to starting with fairly loose, informal and 
virtual arrangements, before formalising these into more solid institutional structures. 
Many different Southern experts, academics and policy-makers have expressed many 
different views on how and where to take the SSC agenda forward. In the next few sec-
tions, I will illustrate a few different options of where such discussions could be hosted 
and where the development of a South-South development cooperation framework could 
eventually take place.

107  Remarks made by an African official at the Delhi meeting (April 2013) and an Indian diplomat in 
Addis Ababa (June 2013) have also warned against making reference to the idea of ‘Southern DAC’ or 
‘DAC of the South’ because of the negative historical connotations of the institution ‘DAC’ and also in 
order not to give the impression that Southern providers are now repeating the same antiquated models 
of the North. 
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Regional systems 
A very important role in norm-setting and the accountability of development cooperation 
is played by regional organisations that coordinate the work of several countries and 
stakeholders within a particular region. They serve as useful intermediaries between the 
national and global frameworks, also stimulating a good deal of South-South cooperation 
among neighbours (Nairobi Outcome Document 2009). In this regard institutions such as 
the African Union (AU), the Pacific Islands Forum, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Arab 
League (to name but a few) have played an important role in promoting collaboration and 
knowledge exchange among developing nations. We have also previously discussed the 
role of the APRM as a powerful platform for the promotion of accountability between the 
African nations. The AU-NEPAD has also facilitated the development of the African 
Platform for Development Effectiveness (AP-Dev) and its subsequent mutual accountabil-
ity framework. The African Consensus (2011) emphasises the complementary role of 
North-South and South-South cooperation, both needing to be led by recipient country 
priorities. Such platforms also allow developing countries to consolidate their views into a 
unified and stronger voice which will in turn allow them to negotiate better with bigger 
development partners and engage more effectively in other multilateral fora. 
A similar platform for development planning, monitoring and cooperation discussions is 
similarly provided by many regional banks and development finance institutions such as 
the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), the Inter-
American Development Bank (IAB) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), to name a 
few. 
GPEDC: constructive dialogue with the North? 
While regional forums are useful, in essence the big emerging powers of the South are 
scattered across different continents and necessitate the existence of wider global fora to 
discuss their common approaches to development cooperation. The OECD-DAC has tried 
very hard to reach out to the developing world, first through the Working Party on Aid 
Effectiveness (WP-Eff) and currently through the Busan Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation (GPEDC). We have seen earlier how this process benefits from 
the decade-long analytical experience and resources provided by the OECD, but how at 
the same time it also discourages major Southern powers such as China, India and Brazil 
from engaging in it because of historical legacies. 
Some middle-income countries, however, have chosen not to take an ‘anti-DAC approach’ 
and instead to engage with Northern partners in a positive, constructive and collaborative 
manner. Countries like Mexico, South Africa, Colombia, Indonesia, Chile, Peru and Tur-
key have recognised the value of engaging in the aid effectiveness process and have also 
taken leadership in initiatives such as the Task Team and Building Blocks on SSC and the 
GPEDC Steering Committee. Although they share similar concerns to the rest of their 
Southern peers, they are engaging proactively with the system of the Global Partnership 
by trying to change it from within and to use it as an opportunity and space to influence 
the development policy of traditional donors. The view of a such group of ‘OECD-
friendly middle-income countries’ is to thus to improve coordination with one another in 
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order to consolidate a more unified and coherent position, as they continue to engage in 
the GPEDC debates108.
Development cooperation by traditional donors has also evolved, improved and come a 
long way since the beginnings in the 1970s. A good deal of North-South cooperation is 
worthy of merit, and important lessons can be drawn from the experience of traditional 
donors especially in connection with transparency, accountability, results orientation, 
monitoring and evaluation. At the very least, emerging donors can ensure that they do not 
repeat the same mistakes that traditional donors encountered in the evolution of their de-
velopment cooperation. This is why it would be useful for Southern partners to keep chan-
nels to the OECD-DAC open, learning what they can from decades of experience by tradi-
tional donors, and picking and choosing what is of relevance to their context. Paris, Accra 
and Busan remain very useful ‘reference points’ for emerging economies as well, as long 
as such regulations are not imposed on them rigidly and they are not pressured into inap-
propriate expectations and unrealistic responsibilities to be borne in the global develop-
ment campaigns. 
The United Nations
When declining to engage in OECD-led processes, countries such as India and Brazil109
always refer back to the United Nations as the natural, legitimate and universal forum 
where most international issues, including development cooperation, should be discussed. 
Historically, in fact, the UN has always been an important platform for the nations of the 
South providing support services to the work of the G77. UN bodies such as UNDESA, 
UNCTAD, UNIDO, the FAO and UNDP all have units specifically dedicated to support-
ing SSC. Since Busan, many have suggested that the United Nations Development Coop-
eration Forum (UNDCF) should be a better, more legitimate and inclusive space in which 
development cooperation could be discussed. The recent UNDCF symposium in Addis 
Ababa (2013) for example hosted a meeting of the Directors-General of South-South Pro-
viders.
While being a more broad-based forum in its representation and more closely connected to 
the MDGs, there is also a substantial degree of scepticism and concern as regards its his-
torical inefficiencies. The massive UN bureaucracy has its limits because it operates very 
slowly and suffers from the influence of multiple political forces that pull it in different 
directions. The sheer number and diversity of stakeholders often make it difficult to reach 
consensus and to agree on clear and bold action for the future. This has led to a decrease in 
political interest in UN forums which are often characterised as mere ‘talk shops’. 
Other useful platforms where developed and developing countries come together to dis-
cuss global challenges of common concern are the World Trade Organizations (WTO), the 
World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, once again, 
such institutions are also criticised for being Northern dominated because voting powers 
are usually commensurate to financial contributions. 
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108  Based on remarks and interviews with diplomats from Mexico, South Africa and Colombia between 
April and August 2013. 
109  Based on interviews with various BRICS officials, June-August 2013. 
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Advancing the agenda in smaller ‘Gs’ 
A powerful forum of world leaders where international development and poverty allevia-
tion has been discussed over the past decade has been the various G8+ meetings (i.e. 
Evian-les-Bains, 2003; Gleneagles, 2005; Heiligendamm, 2007), which often included 
leaders of the developing South. More recently the G8110has evolved into the Group of 
Twenty (G20), which has also constituted a Development Working Group (DWG). The 
G20 members represent 2/3 of the earth’s population, 90% of global trade and 80% of the 
world’s GDP. The G20 is an ‘informal club’ of the world’s economic giants which in-
cludes the major traditional donors (G8), the BRICS countries, and other emerging 
economies such as Mexico, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey.
The strength of the G8+, the G20 as well as the BRICS and IBSA (discussed later) is that 
they carry very strong political clout as they engage Heads of States at the yearly summits. 
Although development cooperation is brought into the debate, and sometimes even SSC 
(see G20 Seoul Summit communiqué 2010), the discussions tend to focus more on manag-
ing the global financial crises, and there is generally very little appetite for accountability 
and peer review (see the outcome of Bali G20 meeting, 2012). 
But the main criticism of the G20 (and also subsequent groupings discussed next) is that, 
at the end of the day, they are still just ‘clubs’ representing a smaller group of nations and 
are far from being legitimate or adequate in representing the concerns of the majority of 
the developing world. As I have discussed in other papers (Besharati 2013a), the tension 
of effective international decision-making frequently lies somewhere between ‘operational 
efficiency’ and ‘broad-based representation’. The international development agenda often 
moves forward faster with smaller groups of similar nations, hence the successes of the 
OECD-DAC and G20. While processes in bigger multilateral forums such as the UN, the 
World Bank and the GPEDC are important and need to continue, there is often value in 
the work of smaller groups to reach consensus quicker, to make more substantial progress 
on certain issues, and thus to advance the agenda more rapidly.  
BRICS
In the current political economy, when one tries to think of a counterweight to the tradi-
tional Western powers, the first thoughts go to the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa (BRICS) formation, the new major alliance of emerging economies aimed at rede-
fining and rebalancing global political and economic order. At the BRICS summits in 
New Delhi in 2012 and Durban in 2013, the announcement about establishing a potential 
BRICS-South Development Bank raised a great deal of hopes as regards the expansion of 
development financing mechanisms, especially for Africa. Moreover the establishment of 
a BRICS Bank would imply the need for a common international development policy and 
an operational framework based on principles and standards which all five countries 
would have to agree on. BRICS could therefore theoretically be a good place to establish a 
development cooperation framework for the South – except that most of the focus of de-
bates is currently on financial governance and less on development. In addition, the group 
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110  The Group of 8 (G8) countries include United States, Italy, Germany, France, Russia, United King-
dom, Canada, and Japan. 
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is technically not a real representation of the South as it contains Russia which was once 
considered one of the imperialist powers of the North.
IBSA
A more appropriate platform on which to have discussions surrounding South-South de-
velopment cooperation is possibly the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Forum. The three 
countries have been working very closely for some ten years, exchanging knowledge and 
experiences among themselves. All three countries have strong Southern credentials, a 
common history of struggle against oppression, and similar challenges of fighting poverty 
and inequality. They are all successful pluralistic democracies that cherish the principles 
of accountability and multi-stakeholder participation. Moreover all aspire to playing a 
stronger role in a more balanced global governance system. Although they share the same 
challenges of inequality, they also have well-articulated experiences in poverty alleviation 
and social protection systems. 
Together with China, all three countries are among the largest Southern providers, main-
tain significant development cooperation programmes particularly in Africa, share a simi-
lar vision and approach to South-South cooperation, and thus can learn a lot from each 
other’s experiences. The three countries have also agreed to undertake more systematic 
exchanges between their development cooperation agencies111. Since 2003, IBSA has 
established a Joint Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (aka the IBSA Fund112) to 
finance development projects across the world. The allocations from the IBSA Trust Fund 
are governed by 10 effectiveness criteria that could potentially be refined and expanded 
upon in order to develop a development cooperation framework for the South (Sidiropou-
lous 2012; Besharati 2013a). 
One strong political drive that brings India, Brazil, and South Africa together is the com-
mon aspiration of creating an appropriate counterweight to the dominant Northern powers 
in order to restructure the international order and create a better representation of the 
South in global governance institutions. Hence this sentiment could be cultivated and 
channelled to advance more effectively the SSC agenda. While IBSA could be a very 
good platform on which to initiate such debates, the problem lies in the fact that it would 
exclude China, which is a very important player and possibly the biggest Southern pro-
vider in the world. Also, the initial enthusiasm around IBSA has also been recently over-
shadowed by the more sensational BRICS alliance. The decision of President Rousseff of 
Brazil to forgo the 2013 New Delhi IBSA summit is also an indication of the loss of mo-
mentum in IBSA113. The development of a common cooperation framework between the 
three countries could thus potentially inject some spirit into the process and maybe resur-
rect the almost defunct Southern alliance. 

111  Feedback from various IBSA diplomats, April-July 2013. 
112  Every year each country contributes US $1 million to the joint Trust Fund managed by UNDP. 
113  See http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/09/05/brazil-sees-bric-limitations/comment-page-
1/#comment-1196840 and http://www.postwesternworld.com/2013/07/04/is-ibsa-dead/.
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The ‘poorest’ to the forefront 
The fora discussed above all have their strengths and weaknesses. This is why to a certain 
extent all of them need to be explored and exploited to advance the South-South develop-
ment cooperation agenda. Synergies between these platforms can also contribute to the 
increased accountability of various players in the development cooperation landscape. As 
most of these ideas are still at early conceptual stages, we therefore need to observe care-
fully how the political and economic landscape evolves in the next few years and what 
dynamics will emerge in the lead up to the GPEDC ministerial meeting in Mexico in 
2014, and shortly after that. 
The OECD, the G20, the BRICS and the IBSA are all useful, but ultimately they remain 
‘exclusive’ groups. Even if the objective is to include the major ‘Southern providers’, 
these groups still exclude a large number of important SSC players in Latin America, the 
Middle East and South-East Asia. Even if – for the sake of efficiency – work begins in a 
smaller group of emerging powers, such as BRICS or IBSA, it will eventually have to be 
brought back to the bigger UN forum in order to seek engagement, legitimacy and en-
dorsement by the broader group of developing nations. 
Yet, what is maybe more important than involving all the key middle-income countries is 
the importance of involving the least-developed countries (LDCs) who are the prime re-
cipients of development assistance programmes. Any platform, whether Northern or 
Southern, which endeavours to alleviate global poverty, needs to ensure that the voices of 
the poor are properly captured, and that the main beneficiaries of development cooperation 
are at the ‘driving seat’ of the partnership. Although this has not always been the case 
historically, at least on paper traditional donors have also affirmed this important princi-
ple. Emerging economies clearly do not want to distance themselves from the rest of the 
developing countries and create arbitrary lines between low-income countries and middle-
income countries which are nevertheless still the largest basins containing the world’s 
poor.
That is why, ultimately, country-led accountability frameworks, and monitoring and 
evaluation systems to assess the performance of all development partners is the key way 
forward. Better evidence needs to emerge from developing countries themselves, particu-
larly in Africa, of the contribution both traditional donors as well as new partners are mak-
ing to the lives of the most deprived and marginalised populations of the planet. 
12. Conclusions: bringing it all together 
The exact role and responsibilities of emerging economies in international development 
cooperation have been and still are being much debated in the political and academic are-
nas. To a large extent, definitions, principles, standards and monitoring frameworks to 
assess the quality and impact of SSC still require to be elaborated by the stakeholders 
concerned so to increase the effectiveness and accountability of such new forms of devel-
opment cooperation. 
Although the Busan process has evolved very rapidly, the emerging economies have not 
had enough internal discussions to consolidate a common position and understanding on 
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these issues and to be able to engage constructively in the Global Partnership debates. 
Middle-income countries need more time to develop their own narrative114, to consult their 
constituency, to develop a clear framework, to define their approach better, and to formu-
late their position on international development cooperation. 
Developing a framework and platform for SSC providers would have to be clearly owned 
and led by the South (including low-income recipients) while the political and financial 
investments need to be available for such a process to take place. The process could com-
mence with increased communication and the sharing of information before evolving into 
dialogue, coordination, the setting of common norms and standards, and eventually in-
creased peer review and accountability among partners.  
Establishing a framework for South-South development cooperation will advance more 
rapidly if it is elevated from political and emotional rhetoric to the engagement of the 
technical expertise from academics, economists, think-tanks, civil society and develop-
ment specialists present throughout the developing world. Southern technocrats could 
assist in the development of appropriate parameters, criteria, indicators and metric systems 
to measure the quantity, quality, effectiveness and impact of the development initiatives of 
Southern providers. Once the technical blueprints have been developed these would be 
discussed and endorsed in the diplomatic circles of the various emerging economies, by 
building consensus at summits such as IBSA, BRICS, regional institutions and the United 
Nations fora. 
While it is important to have a separate South-South cooperation narrative, this eventually 
needs to also come together with North-South cooperation to form a consolidated interna-
tional development process which includes industrialised, emerging, low-income countries 
and other important development partners (civil society, the private sector, and so on) in a 
joint global endeavour. Development cooperation needs to be seen through a more holistic 
lens, looking beyond just aid and including coherent responses to other important areas, 
such as trade, investment, infrastructure, capacity-building, governance reforms, domestic 
resource mobilization, remittances and other sources of financing for development. The 
debates in the GPEDC and in the UN fora need to transcend the old ideological North-
South divide and explore how the flow of money, people, goods, ideas and technology 
from both developed and developing countries can contribute to reducing poverty and 
inequality, and help the international community successfully complete the MDGs and 
embark with resolve and a united vision on the next post-2015 global development plan. 
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114  Remarks made by both Mexican and Indian diplomats engaged in the GPEDC. 
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